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CHAPTER 1 
"CORPORATE VISIBILITY" AND THE TEACHING OF ENGLISH 
Many educational plans have failed because their 
authors designed them according to their own per-
sonal views of reality, never once taking into ac-
count (except as mere objects of their action) the 
men-in-a-situation to whom their action was osten-
sibly directed. 
Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed 
No meaningful discussion of teaching in postsecondary 
education can take place in isolation from the political and 
cultural forces to which institutions of higher learning are 
presently subject. Debates concerning ends and means of col-
lege education have been omnipresent in the mass media in the 
last few years; much of this discussion has concerned the 
discipline of English. More specifically, the teaching of 
English has been a recurrent theme, either overtly or by im-
plication. For whether a particular discussion took as its 
ostensible topic the canon or feminism or critical theory, 
the point of contention was almost always the effects that 
teaching a given subject matter would have on students. 
Although mapping where these debates currently stand is 
inevitably an incomplete project, a recent newspaper essay 
may provide a useful indication. Authored by an East Coast 
journalism professor, the article rehearses a familiar 
paradigm: members of a group long under assault finally turn 
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on one another (or at least are represented as doing so) and 
themselves declare the death of the movement they had once so 
ardently supported. Such a scenario is common in American 
politics; witness the current demise of "liberalism," accom-
plished in part by former liberals. Similarly, several 
prominent critical theorists are cited as announcing a "post-
theoretical" age. Patricia Spacks proclaims that "'decon-
struction is pretty much dead - except for maybe one or two 
people at Yale'" (Yagoda). Jeffrey Williams claims that the-
ory is "'a dead end. At a certain point you say, "So what? 
Let's go on from here."'" The author adds, 
Now that budgets are being pinched and academic 
departments are attempting to broaden their 
markets, obscurity has lost some of its appeal. 
Another difficulty is that many of the insights 
afforded by the new [theoretical] approaches have 
not proved conducive to further inquiry. "DeMan's 
book Allegories of Reading keeps getting back to 
the same notion, that texts are unreadable," 
Jeffrey Williams says. 
Thus, according to the popular press, we have moved from the 
institutional hegemony of theory to the death of theory, all. 
in a few short years. How did this come to happen?, one 
might wonder. And what are the consequences for teaching En-
glish? 
Ironically, the alleged age of posttheory has come about 
through the efforts of theorists to make "theory" more "in-
telligible" to the nonacademic world. Disciplinary work to 
achieve this goal of, as Gerald Graff puts it, "corporate 
visibility" began in response to widespread charges in the 
media that English and other humanities fields were overem-
phasizing arcane theories at the expense of traditional ap-
proaches to classic texts ("Future" 256). Though such criti-
cism has been waged against purveyors of tbe new in English 
since the advent of the discipline, the latest "culture war" 
or "humanities crisis" quickly became fraught with political 
and economic consequences. At stake were government fellow-
ships and grants, student enrollment, and faculty positions 
and salaries - all jeopardized by popular media attacks on 
"political correctness," "theory" (especially deconstruction, 
feminism and marxism) and "cultural relativism." 
Hence the drive for "intelligibility" and "corporate 
visibility." MLA conference sessions on "The New Formalism," 
"The New Pragmatism" and "Posttheory" were held, which func-
tioned to represent the profession's "return" to "common 
sense" work. Theorists wrote books for lay audiences that 
accentuated their personal backgrounds, to "humanize" aca-
demic workers and their work.l This was interpreted by some 
observers as theorists "hav[ing] made a transition from some-
times inpenetrable high theory to prose. . that is suitable 
1 Most notably, see Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Colored People 
(Knopf, 1994); Cornel West, Race Matters (Beacon Press, 
1993); Gerald Graff, Beyond the Culture war.12. (Norton, 1992) 
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- and intended - for comparatively wide audiences" (Yagoda). 
Within the discourse of "theory" itself, it has become in-
creasingly fashionable to emphasize one's distance from de-
construction and other critical theories thought to be overly 
obscure, as Spacks and Williams' comments exemplify. The 
overall rhetorical effect of these events was one of concili-
ation toward critics of theory. "You were right," theorists 
in effect conceded, "Our work was too abstract and Jargon-
laden; we will try to write more clearly and for a wider, lay 
audience." 
This is not to discount the contributions that some the-
orists have made toward re-presenting today's professors as 
personable public intellectuals. But the overall flight from 
theory - the drive for corporate visibility and intelligibil-
ity - has not "solved" the "problems," ended the "culture 
war" or "resolved" the humanities "crisis." There was not, I 
wish to argue, a lack of corporate visibility concerning the 
work of English teachers. Rather, there was too much corpo-
rate visibility, in several senses. Graff's choice of words 
is telling: the Latin corporare means "to make into a body," 
which may describe what happened to English, as it became 
widely represented as a homogenous body of politically cor-
rect discourse by the corporate-controlled mass media. Most 
importantly, a recurring theme in the media representations 
was that English and other humanities disciplines lacked the 
"accountability" to their "consumers" that is expected in the 
"real" (i.e. corporate) world. 
Oddly, many academics seemed surprised by this "war" 
against English et al., and their public responses, it seems 
to me, exposed their naivete about the nature and function of 
the mass media in a capitalist society. Consider, for in-
stance, a Chicago Tribune article about the "war." Not sur-
prisingly, Teachers for a Democratic Culture was referred to 
as a "fledgling organization," while the National Association 
of Scholars was called simply a "conservative group" 
(Jouzaitis 1, 10). More problematically, Gerald Graff, who 
was interviewed for the article, made continual references to 
the ignorance of the "public" about the work of academics. 
The reporter quotes him making such comments as "'the public 
mistakenly has been led to believe'" and "'yet this story is 
believed by the public'" (10). The public has evidently 
swallowed whole a '"inaccurate and often frightening [media] 
picture of what's going on in universities'" that is 
"'ridiculously false'" (1). Graff does academics no favors 
by figuring the public as not t..;frribly bright and easily ma-
nipulated and blaming them for misunderstanding university 
work. His performance reconfirms stereotypes of academics as 
elitist, snobbish and more than willing to place the burden 
of being understood on laypersons instead of themselves. 
Such statements also reveal a remarkable ignorance about 
the function of the American media. In the Statement of 
Principles of Teachers for a Democratic Culture, Graff and 
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Gregory Jay state that "the mainstream media have reported 
misinformed opinions as if they were established facts." One 
must ask: Why is this surprising? If the mainstream media 
normally acted as Graff and Jay would have them do, alterna-
tive media would have no need to exist. If accuracy and in-
formed opinions about the left's activities were hallmarks of 
mainstream journalism, America would be a much different 
place. 
In this context, efforts toward greater corporate visi-
bility do not serve the enterprise of critical theory well. 
Why, one wonders, has it been branded unfashionable or ille-
gitimate to use a specialized disciplinary jargon, when, say, 
medicine or plumbing or physics is accorded such latitude? 
There is no widespread outcry per se if an American medical 
researcher wishes to apply a European discovery or theory of 
treatment to American patients, but an American literature 
teacher using a Foucauldian approach risks denigration in a 
reductive newspaper article. 
To the posttheorists and media commentators, it is ap-
parently not so obvious that the rhetoric of some kinds of 
critical theory is not easily reducible or translatable for a 
lay audience. Nor, I would argue, is it always appropriate 
to try. There is little need, I have found in my own teach-
ing, to attempt to make college sophomores experts in Fou-
cauldian or Derridean terminology and methodology. But there 
is significant value in introducing ideas about power,· knowl-
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edge, speech and writing into the classroom without going 
much beyond mentioning their authors. The possibilities for 
integrating critical theory and pedagogy are best realized 
given the recognition that theory is both an often-arcane 
means of communication among professional scholars and a set 
of ideas that can inform and improve classroom teaching. It 
is not necessary to dismiss theory as "dead" or nihilistic 
for purposes of better "corporate visibility" for English, as 
proof to the "real world" that students are getting their 
money's worth in literature and writing classes. 
The aim of the present study is to move beyond the limi-
tations of the educational projects to be subsequently de-
scribed, to forge a "fourth way" that is neither exclusively 
"radical," "liberal" nor "conservative." As Dewey wrote, a 
revisionary pedagogy 
does not mean. . a compromise between opposed 
schools of thought, to find a via media, nor. 
an eclectic combination of points picked out 
hither and yon from all schools. It means the 
necessity of the introduction of a new order of 
conceptions leading to new modes of practice. 
(Experience 5) 
The "new order of conceptions" to be elaborated upon in the 
present study is underpinned by "(self)critical thinking" - a 
mode of intellectual work that not only focuses on the sub-
ject matter to be studied but also attempts to analyze 
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self-consciously the subject positions assumed by the 
intellectual worker. This phrase obviously brings to mind 
the familiar objective of "critical thinking," which is 
presented in university catalogues and course syllabi as a 
general aim of higher education, and, especially, English 
courses.2 The primary distinction between the two modes of 
thought concerns the thinker herself. That is, while 
critical thinking emphasizes an investigation of the ideo-
logical workings of a given subject matter, (self) critical 
thinking urges that one turn that critical analysis upon 
oneself as well, considering how one's own ideological 
positioning makes possible certain kinds of analysis while 
disallowing others. This process of (self) consciousness-
raising should include both teachers and students; as a 
teacher, one may become preoccupied with getting the material 
across to the exclusion of considering the psychosocial 
dynamics of the persons present in the classroom. Therefore, 
(self)critical thinking calls for treating the often-
conflicting subjectivities of the classroom as texts them-
selves to be studied and ongoing attention to such "marginal" 
texts as students' comments in class discussions and indi-
vidual conferences and their informal writing in a course, 
with response to these texts that encourages their authors to 
consider why they discourse as they do and what implications 
2 See Chapter 4 for a fuller treatment of the distinctions 
between critical thinking and (self) critical thinking. 
8 
there are for discoursing in those ways. Of course, arguing 
for such a pedagogy is not entirely new; the current study is 
indebted to the work of many theorists who called for 
pedagogical change in the 1980s.3 
However, both political correctness and the attempts to 
"solve" it through greater corporate visibility have made re-
visionary pedagogies more difficult to introduce. Students 
and teachers have been subjected to conflicting media repre-
sentations of, on one hand, dangerous, leftist professors 
denying the existence of truth, standards and literature, 
and, on the other, posttheorists validating critics of the-
ory. Hence the calls for a conservative "back to the basics" 
approach or the putatively more-liberal "teaching the con-
flicts" paradigm to alleviate the "disorder." The difficulty 
3 For an overview of earlier work in English that concerned 
pedagogy, see especially Gerald Graff, Professing Literature 
(U of Chicago P, 1987); James Berlin, Writing Instruction in 
Nineteenth-Century American Colleges (Southern Illinois UP, 
1984); Berlin, Rhetoric and Reality: Writing Instruction in 
American Colleges, 1900-1985 (Southern Illinois UP, 1987); 
and Susan Miller, Textual Carnivals: the Politics of 
Composition (Southern Illinois University P, 1991). 
A brief list of important works on critical/radical ped-
agogy in the 1980s and '90s includes Barbara Johnson, ed., 
The Pedagogical Imperative (Yale UP, 1982); Robert Scholes, 
Textual Power (Yale UP, 1985); Gregory Ulmer, Applied Gramma-
tology (Johns Hopkins UP, 1985); G. Douglas Atkins and 
Michael Johnson, eds. Writing and Reading Differently (UP of 
Kansas, 1985); Cary Nelson, ed. Theory in the Classroom (U 
of Illinois P, 1985); Sharon Crowley, A Teacher's Introduc-
tion to Deconstruction (NCTE, 1989); Henry Giroux and Stanley 
Aronowitz, Postmodern Education (U of Minnesota P, 1990); 
Donald Morton and Mas'ud Zavarzadeh, eds. Theory/Pedagogy/ 
Politics: Texts for Change (U of Illinois P, 1991); and 
Graff, Beyond the Culture Wars. 
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for a revisionary pedagogy lies more in such proposed "solu-
tions" than it does in the alleged "problems." 
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"Political correctness" et al. - the current educational 
malady - can be seen as the progeny of the 1975 "literacy 
crisis," brought about by a decline in SAT scores and open 
admissions policies, and the 1983 "A Nation at Risk" campaign 
that cited a lack of agreed-upon educational goals as the 
primary reason why "Johnny can't write" (Shor Culture 105, 
111, 60, 62). The blame soon settled upon the revisions of 
curricula and canons; the political right began battling to 
stop the alleged phasing out of the Great Books and Great 
Ideas that was causing America to fall behind educationally, 
aided by self-professed university "liberals" like Allan 
Bloom and E.D. Hirsch who possess, as Robert Scholes wrote, 
"a nostalgia for a not very closely examined past in which 
things were better'" (qtd. in Graff Professing, back cover). 
This nostalgia obscures a conservative political agenda that 
seeks to purge academia of the remnants of the alleged "per-
missive education" of the 1960s that condoned, in Ira Shor's 
words, "too little writing and reading, too many soft elec-
tives and too few required hard academic courses" (Culture 
67). The attempts of some universities to combat what Shor 
calls the "conservative restoration" have met with charges 
that students are being "indoctrinated" with "politically 
correct" ideas. 
There was widespread acceptance of most of these-
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arguments, despite statistical evidence to the contrary. Mike 
Rose notes that 
[i]n 1890, 3.5 percent of all seventeen-year-olds 
graduated from high school; by 1970, the number was 
75.6 percent. [while] [i]n Sweden 45 to 50 
percent complete the gymnasium (grades 11 to 12); 
in the Federal Republic of Germany, about 15 
percent are entered in the Oberprima (grade 13). 
( 6) 
"[O]ur schools," he argues, "have always been populated with 
students who don't meet some academic standard," but "[w]e 
figure things were once different [and] we look to a past--
one that never existed--for the effective, no-nonsense peda-
gogy we assume the past once had" (7). Arguments like 
William Bennett's are readily accepted: "Fundamentally, edu-
cation reform is a matter of improved results. . Whatever 
changes we make in American education - and changes are 
clearly in order - their value must be determined, finally 
. by measurable improvements in [their] knowledge and 
skills" (222). The question that remains - "[I]f educational 
excellence were brought about, how could it be recognized?" -
goes unasked (Cherryholmes 37). 
Education has been surmnoned to stem the tide and keep 
America culturally homogenous in the wake of increasing het-
erogeneity. Rose writes that education 
is being asked to do what our politics and -
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economics have failed to do: diminish differences 
in achievement, narrow our gaps, bring us together, 
Instead of analysis of the complex web of causes of 
poor performance, we are offered a faith in the 
unifying power of a body of knowledge, whose 
infusion will bring the rich and the poor, the 
longtime disaffected and the uprooted newcomers 
into cultural unanimity. (237) 
In my own teaching experience, I have found that the main 
thing that "political correctness" seems to mean to students 
is that whites and males should be careful about who might 
hear certain kinds of "jokes" they tend to tell, and that mi-
norities and women can acceptably be more vocal in their re-
actions against said jokes. Most students do not connect the 
PC phenomenon to larger issues of political agendas and 
curriculum debates - which is precisely what not only univer-
sity administrators but also the political right want. The 
former don't want to make too many waves; they fear calls 
from alumni, parents, benefactors and governmental agencies 
about how Johnny, Mary and the other students aren't being 
"educated right." The latter wants these groups riled up, as 
a conservative former student newspaper editor argues: 
Many conservatives. . actually want a 
politically correct campus. . Conservatives 
never sought parity with the campus liberals. We 
sought - and still seek - ascendancy. We wanted 
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our universities to craft conservative curricula. 
(Kelner 38) 
The political right does not want their motives revealed, es-
pecially to students; they wish the debate over education to 
be viewed as the subversives from the '60s versus upholders 
of solid American educational traditions and values. Such 
dichotomizing, combined with conservatives' nostalgia for, to 
borrow Stephanie Coontz's phrase, "the way we never were," 
has dampened enthusiasm for new ways of teaching informed by 
critical theory. In fact, the back-to-basics movement has 
been so successful at stifling more-widespread pedagogical 
innovation that it prompted a seemingly liberal counterap-
proach that explicitly thematizes (and legitimizes) its argu-
ments with revisionary pedagogies by making those arguments 
the subject matter to be studied - "teaching the conflicts." 
Gerald Graff first suggested "teaching the conflicts" in 
1987's Professing Literature, in which he sought a solution 
to what he calls the "culture wars" - canon revision, politi-
cal correctness, etc. He has described and further refined 
the idea in various essays since then; forms of these essays 
have been collected in a recent book. Graff's frequent pro-
mulgation of the idea is a sign that he takes it quite seri-
ously - and, I would argue, so should English teachers, since 
Graff speaks for them often, on National Public Radio, in the 
Chronicle of Higher Education, on the lecture circuit, and 
now, as one of the founders of Teachers for a Democratic 
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Culture, the new voice of the "politically correct." For all 
of the "low corporate visibility" that he attributes to 
English studies today, Graff has received about as much "vis-
ibility" as a left-leaning literary theorist can in the pre-
sent political climate ("Future" 256). Graff's self-ap-
pointed role as spokesperson for "English" (if not the entire 
university, in some instances) necessitates a thorough cri-
tique of his work on pedagogy. 
Graff's current position as a defender of theory is 
noteworthy in light of both his past and present work. Cur-
tis White notes that: 
It was not all that long ago that Gerald Graff 
published a book called Literature Against Itself, 
which in many ways introduced the shape of things 
to come in (to be sure) trashier reactionary 
tracts like Alvin Kernan's The Death of Literature. 
Published in 1979, Literature Against Itself was a 
broadside against the politics of the 
sixties, against contemporary theory of the 
poststructural variety, and against the aesthetics 
of postmodern fiction. (4) 
Interestingly, William Bennett, in To Reclaim a Legacy, also 
blamed 60s politics and "theory" "for undermining humanities 
education and humanistic values" (Graff "Academic" 10). Graff 
has undergone an intellectual transformation since then; he 
stated in 1989 that '"I realized I was learning more from the 
new theories that I was attacking than from anybody else'" 
(qtd. in White 4). However, from the 1979 Graff to the 1984 
Bennett to the 1992 Graff, we seem to have "Graff Against 
Himself"; put another way, the critic who helped create what 
became the PC problem is now in charge of "solving" it. 
The problem here, though, is not that Graff's thinking 
about theory and teaching has "evolved"; it is in his "solu-
tion." I want to suggest that Graff's cure for our current 
educational malaise is underpinned by the same problematic 
theories about curriculum and pedagogy that he now widely 
criticizes. Graff describes his project as follows: 
My argument is that the most educationally 
effective way to deal with present conflicts over 
education and culture is to teach the conflicts 
themselves. And not just teach the conflicts in 
separate classrooms, but structure them into the 
curriculum, using them to give the curriculum the 
coherence it badly lacks. ( "Teach" 51) 
According to Graff, departments and/or institutions should 
"thematize the semester," using such topics as "Interpreta-
tion across the Disciplines; The Crisis of Traditional Cul-
ture; Majority and Minority Cultures; The Canon Controversy 
(Graff "Other" 835). The English curriculum would 
therefore "cohere" based on its conflicts or "incoherence." 
This idea of coherence based on incoherence might pose 
conceptual difficulties for some of the lay audience that 
15 
16 
Graff hopes to convert (as he himself was changed by theory), 
but more troubling is that his ideas would seem to be subject 
to the same criticism he once leveled at deconstruction - a 
critical school he now defends from conservative attacks. 
Graff wrote in 1987 that a theory like deManian deconstruc-
tion "is made suspect by its monotonous universality of ap-
plication" (Professing 241). Graff's "conflict" model is sim-
ilarly open to critique; it's the Theory That Eats Other The-
ories. It's seemingly inescapable; if one disagrees with 
Graff, that "conflict" is immediately thematized into his 
model. No disagreement is safe from being commodified in his 
paradigm: the "only alternative" to "traditional consensus 
thinking on education," he argues, is "to agree to disagree" 
("Teach" 66). But one wonders how much of a departure 
"agreeing to disagree" is from "traditional consensus think-
ing." Graff's rhetoric here brings to mind Richard Rorty's 
buzzwords - consensus, community, conversation - and his 
pragmatist project, which, as I will argue in Chapter 2, is 
disturbingly protective of the status quo. 
On the basis of this notion of "agreeing to disagree," 
Graff's idea of teaching the conflicts would be, he claims, 
both "practical and democratic'' (51). I would argue that his 
paradigm is neither, but consider for a moment how it might 
work. A given "conflict-based" course would entail the time 
of at least two professors, relatively equal in rank and se-
niority, who have serious theoretical disagreements on the 
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topic at hand. Since possibly only the largest schools could 
spare having two full-timers in one course, the class would 
either have to be doubly enrolled or of regular size, with 
the department having to cover another section or course with 
another teacher. If the course is doubly enrolled, this 
might mean having 60 or 70 students on hand, which would make 
class discussion difficult at best. The English majors would 
probably contribute the most (as the students most likely to 
be interested in disciplinary conflicts), disallowing time 
for nonmajors to speak up and to become engaged with the 
conflict under discussion. In addition, in such a large 
course, there would inevitably be much more lecturing than if 
the class had only 15 or 20 students. Larger schools, such 
as those Graff notes (Syracuse, Pittsburgh, North Carolina, 
Illinois State), might be able to make the conflict model 
work, but the number of students who might be affected in 
such institutions is an extremely small percentage of the to-
tal number that attend college in some form ("Other" 834). 
More importantly, one might question how "democratic" 
the conflict model actually is; Graff seeks to impose a par-
ticular humanities conflict as a theme onto a course in much 
the same way literary texts are fashioned into "themes" for 
traditional classes. Of course, Graff leaves the choices up 
to individual faculties and institutions ("Teach" 61-62), but 
a potential contradiction arises here: a "democratic" para-
digm that dictates to students what the burning 
controversies of the day are, in a "top-down" fashion. The 
Brazilian educator Paulo Freire's words may be useful here, 
at least metaphorically: 
Unfortunately. in their desire to obtain the 
support of the people for revolutionary action, 
revolutionary leaders of ten fall for the banking 
line of planning program content from the top 
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down. They approach the. masses with projects 
which may correspond to their own view of the 
world, but not to that of the people. (83) 
Graff seems to dismiss the possibility that students may not 
be ostensibly interested in the "culture war" or canon revi-
sion. This is not to say that they shouldn't be, for as 
Graff and many others have noted, students have an important 
stake in these debates since they ultimately affect the way 
students are taught. What's suspect is Graff's methodology 
of forcing students in a given course to study a particular 
conflict as if it were a priori certain that the conflict is 
"important" to students. Having taught a unit on the canon 
controversy in a writing course, I have seen the apathy that 
results from imposing a "conflict" onto students - and I won-
der if it would have mattered if another teacher were present 
whose views contradicted mine. There is a good chance, I 
think, that students would still see academics' disagreements 
as unconnected with their own experiences and interests. 
Graff does write that, to "most people outside academia" 
19 
(and I would include undergraduates in this group), for exam-
ple, "the phrase 'traditional literary studies' has always 
evoked approximately the same degree of recognition as a word 
like 'problematize' evokes today - which is to say, none" 
("Academic" 7). Here, he recognizes that what is controver-
sial or "problematic" to academics may seem utterly unimpor-
tant to nonacademics. In his model, however, Graff doesn't 
consider this fact. This is not to say that it is possible 
for teachers to be totally unimposing when they teach; class-
room power relations cannot be so easily subverted. However, 
teaching a particular "conflict" could end up being not un-
like teaching a particular literary text, in that the object 
of study for the course is chosen for the students. And I 
cannot help but be a bit skeptical of the practical possibil-
ities of a revisionary model proposed by someone who admitted 
at a 1991 conference that he was only providing "concrete ex-
amples" for his ideas after being pressured to do so by his 
peers. In hindsight it may be unfair to criticize Graff for 
not being interested initially in how his ideas might play 
out. But I believe this initial lack of concern diminishes 
his argument - advertised prominently in the subtitle of his 
latest book - that the practice of his ideas will "revitalize 
American education" (Beyond) . 
While I am highly critical of the conservative back-to-
basics movement and the liberal teaching-the-conflicts ap-
proach, the work of adherents of "radical" pedagogy must be 
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subject to critique as well - though radical pedagogy has not 
been the barrier to pedagogical reform that the other two ap-
proaches have. Radical pedagogy obviously represents the 
left wing in a continuum of educational reform efforts, but 
despite political sympathies I may have with radical peda-
gogues, they have not provided "the answer" to the American 
educational "malaise," either. 
One must begin a discussion of radical pedagogy with the 
work of Paulo Freire's American disciples. They largely have 
followed two general avenues of critique. The first, which 
may be represented by the efforts of Henry Giroux, Stanley 
Aronowitz and Peter McLaren, can be summarized as follows: 
[R]adical educational theorists have argued that 
schools do not provide opportunities for self-
and social empowerment. It has also challenged 
the dominant assumption that schools currently 
constitute major sites of social and economic 
mobility. [C]ritical pedagogy. . dedicated 
to self-empowerment and social transformation. 
has sharply etched the political dimensions of 
schooling, arguing that schools operate mainly to 
reproduce the discourses, values, and privileges 
of existing elites. (Giroux and McLaren 153, 155) 
These educators view American students in much the same way 
Freire is represented as approaching illiterate South 
American peasants, as subjects who required "liberation." In 
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the United States, though, as Graff points out, this process 
of liberation becomes more complicated: "If a student were to 
end up deciding that he or she is not oppressed, or is not 
oppressed in the way or for the reasons that Freire thinks, 
one suspects that Freire could not count such a decision as 
an autonomous one" ("Academic" 13). 
A second impulse that follows from Freire is might be 
called "theory substitution" - that pedagogy would be well-
served if traditional approaches were replaced by those un-
derpinned by postmodernism and poststructuralism.4 This line 
of reasoning, exemplified in the work of Mas'ud Zavarzadeh 
and Donald Morton among others, seeks to replace the "domi-
nant curriculum" with "(post)modern pedagogy," for the domi-
nant curriculum is "an ideological operation, the purpose of 
which is to maintain the existing system by producing sub-
jects who. . see it as acceptable [and] also perceive it 
as the way things are, ought to be, and will be" (12, 
2). The aim of this second Freirean line is much the same as 
the first - the "liberation" of the student subject from an 
oppressive educational syst~em. However, there is a need to 
4 Throughout this study, I use "postmodernism" in a general 
sense to refer to both literary and theoretical discourses 
("postmodern" fiction, poststructuralism) within our late 
capitalist historical period commonly referred to as "post-
modernity." Since the adjective "postmodern" could stem from 
either noun, I will try to indicate by context whether I am 
referring to postmodernism or postmodernity. I take "post-
structuralism" to ~efer to the theoretical discourses 
(deconstruction, new historicism, certain kinds of feminism 
and marxism) within the movement of postmodernism and -the pe-
riod of postmodernity. 
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theorize the position of the student subject within educa-
tional and pedagogical systems much differently, recognizing 
that her construction within a distinctively American edu-
cational system must be taken into account for a revisionary 
pedagogy. 
That is, much radical pedagogical work has tended to 
idealize (and thus decontextualize) the student subject, 
positing her as oppressed by traditional pedagogy and curric-
ula. It also relies on an inappropriate reading of Freire's 
idea of the "pedagogy of the oppressed." Though it is a cru-
cial argument of the present study that students have been 
(and are being) done a disservice by certain conventional 
ways of teaching (to be described in Chapter 3), one must be 
careful to recognize that, in America particularly, few stu-
dents "see" overt signs of "oppression" in their daily lives. 
In a discussion about an Adrienne Rich essay in one of my 
composition classes, for example, her argument that women 
still suffered from many manifestations of patriarchal domi-
nation did not resonate even with the women students. In a 
society where many forms of oppression operate subtly, it is 
no surprise that an argument like Freire's often does not 
ring true with students. 
This situation poses questions for a revisionary peda-
gogy: Whose interests should it serve? Should radical peda-
gogues categorize traditionally educated students as victims 
of oppression and seek to deprogram them? There are moments 
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in the texts of some Freireans that lead one to think so. 
For Giroux and Aronowitz, the question of which direction a 
revisionary pedagogy should take is rather simple, one of 
"whether we educate students to adapt to existing relations 
of power or to learn how to read society differently so as to 
apply the principles of critical democracy to the creation of 
new and radical forms of community" (96). This seems to be a 
rhetorical question for them, but I maintain it should not 
be. 
For there are, I think, more than two possibilities for 
action, despite Giroux and Aronowitz's binary rhetoric. 
Freire himself warns against what they advocate, when he 
writes that leaders of a movement can mistakenly "approach 
the masses with projects which may correspond to their own 
view of the world, but not to that of the people" (83). While 
American teachers certainly have the freedom to try to impose 
their personal ideologies upon students (although the extent 
to which such an effort would succeed is questionable given 
the fact that the alleged power of professors to impose £ 
viewpoint on students is always subject to disruption by 
other professors professing other viewpoints), those who wish 
to enact a revisionary pedagogy should be guided more by what 
students want to know than by what teachers assume they 
should know. To assume unquestioningly that students have 
been victimized by a dominant curriculum and therefore must 
be liberated from its hegemony is to recapitulate the-exact 
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structure of the traditional curriculum in which students are 
told what they should (want to) know. John Dewey noted, 
It is not too much to say that an educational 
philosophy which professes to be based on the idea 
of freedom may become as dogmatic as ever was the 
traditional education that is reacted against. 
For any theory and set of practices is dogmatic 
which is not based upon critical examination of 
its own underlying principles. (Experience 22) 
To teach differently requires structural change, not just a 
different politics that promises to "liberate," not "oppress" 
students. Radical pedagogues, I would argue, often miss 
Dewey's crucial point: a new pedagogy should not merely be 
critical of the old practices it seeks to change; it must 
also be (self) critical - that is, critical of "its own under-
lying principles." 
The tendency in the radical pedagogy of Afnerican Freire-
ans to cast debates about teaching methods and curricula into 
binary terms of liberation versus oppression reveals a prob-
lematic conception of the student as pedagogical subject. 
This tendency has at least two likely sources. The first, 
most obvious reason is the tenor and rhetoric of much of 
Freire's work, especially Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Reports 
of his work with illiterate peasants under politically re-
pressive conditions exhibit, not unsurprisingly, a proclivity 
toward an "us versus them" mentality. It is difficult to 
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fault Freire for representing events in this way; in reality, 
his situation largely consisted of the struggle between those 
like himself who seek to spread literacy and the repressive 
governments of Chile and Brazil who knew that a literate 
populace was potentially disruptive politically. The 
problem, however, is that Freire's rhetoric has infiltrated 
the discourse of American theorists like Giroux and Aronowitz 
without adequate translation and contextualization for 
American education. "'We were blind, now our eyes have been 
opened,'" the words of Freirean students, seem to have 
become the implicit slogan of American radical pedagogy 
(Freire, back cover). The distinctions that Freire draws 
between his particular experiences and his more general model 
have not been respected by his American adherents. For 
example, Freire also argues for "the solution of the teacher-
student contradiction, by reconciling the poles of the 
contradiction so that both are simultaneously teachers and 
students" (59). What seems problematic for would-be 
Freireans, though, is that Freire doesn't see resolving the 
teacher/student opposition as necessarily following basic 
literacy. He believed (and, by all reports, proved) that 
teaching basic literacy did not have to be an exercise in 
paternalism. One could do this and democratize the teaching 
process simultaneously - a lesson lost seemingly lost on some 
American Freireans. 
Unfortunately, they tend to see Freire as advocating a 
romantic theory of the subject, which in turn leads them to 
see the postmodern subject as problematic. Giroux and 
Aronowitz, for example, write: 
Unfortunately, in many [postmodern] accounts, the 
subject is not only decentered--it ceases to 
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exist. In other accounts, the construction of the 
subject appears to be entirely attributable to 
textual and linguistic functions. The subject is 
constructed, but bears no responsibility for 
agency, since he or she is merely a heap of 
fragments bereft of any self-consciousness 
regarding the contradictory nature of his or her 
own experience. (78) 
In Chapter 2, I will discuss the kind of subject traditional, 
New Criticism-inspired pedagogy has constructed, and in Chap-
ter 4 I will describe the (self)critical subject that a revi-
sionary pedagogy might engender. Here, though, I want to 
note briefly the theoretical problems that arise from a con-
sideration of Giroux and Arono~itz's critique of the postmod-
ern subject. First, they recuperate a Cartesian notion of 
the self, arguing that postmodernism causes the subject to 
disappear; that is, they presuppose there is an essential 
self that postmodernism has eradicated. Second, they criti-
cize uncited "other accounts" for theorizing the subject as 
constructed entirely by language. This critique follows from 
their insistence elsewhere that the "domain of the text" and 
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that of "the real world" must remain unconflated (78). Their 
fear of postmodernism is unfounded and seems to result from a 
common misreading of Derrida's statement in the Grammatology 
- "il n'y a pas de hors-texte" - as "there is nothing outside 
the text," a poor translation that has long provided ammuni-
tion for critics of deconstruction (and the broader movements 
of postmodernism and poststructuralism) to dismiss it as ir-
rational, nihilistic philosophizing (158). A more accurate 
rendering of Derrida's words is "there is no outside-text," 
which insists only that everything can be read "textually."5 
Thus, the (postmodern) subject is "constructed textually," 
but only in the sense that it can be interpreted as one would 
interpret any other kind of text. 
Third, Giroux and Aronowitz speciously attack the Fou-
cault wing of postmodern thought, stating that the postmodern 
subject "bears no responsibility for agency." Despite enti-
tling their project "postmodern education," they invoke a 
distinctly unpostmodern idea of agency that allows them to 
enact an opposition between actor and acted-upon - that is, a 
firm notion that there is a clearly defined agent to be 
blamed,·praised or otherwise critiqued for a given action. I 
read Foucault as seeking to retheorize the subject in light 
of postmodernism, "depriving the subject. . of its role as 
5 For a complete treatment of the debates over translating 
and "applying" Derridean deconstruction, see Rodolphe Gasche, 
The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of .Reflec-
tion (Harvard UP, 1986). 
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originator, and of analyzing the subject as a variable and 
complex function of discourse" ("Author?" 118). Contrary to 
Giroux and Aronowitz's claim, postmodernism encourages us to 
take a more self-critical view of how individuals are consti-
tuted as subjects within regimes of power and knowledge whose 
discourse and discursivity can be textually analyzed. I also 
read Freire as reconceiving the subject along postmodern 
lines when he writes that the 
solution of the oppressor-oppressed contradiction 
does not lie in a mere reversal of position. 
Nor does it lie in the replacement of the former 
oppressors with new ones who continue to subjugate 
the oppressed all in the name of liberation. 
(43) 
Neither Foucault nor Freire concur with Giroux's and Aronow-
itz's assumption that certain subjects (the "oppressors") 
possess, or are "originators" of power - which is character-
ized as an always negative force. I would argue that Freire 
and Foucault see power as productive, which can be "positive" 
or "negative." Power produced the prison and asylum, but it 
also produces literacy and literate subjects. 
Zavarzadeh and Morton similarly see the student subject. 
as a potential victim who requires liberation from the "domi-
nant curriculum." However, certain tenets of their project 
are contradictory. More specifically, their efforts are 
grounded in what seems to be a paradox: remedying the-
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negative effects of a "dominant [traditional] curriculum" by 
calling for its replacement with a postmodern curriculum, a 
move that is quite unpostmodern. Put another way, I want to 
suggest that the institutionalization of postmodern theory as 
the structuring principle of a department or a curriculum is 
subject to the same charges of hegemony that Zavarzadeh and 
Morton make against the traditional curriculum. 
This theory substitution they seek is in response to the 
institutionalization of a new "theoretical" English curricu-
lum at Syracuse University, in which the Department of En-
glish became the Department of Textual Studies, and post-
structuralism became the structuring principle of the depart-
ment. Results of this ch~nge included the elimination of pe-
riod courses and the addition of more contemporary theory and 
cultural studies classes. They believe, however, the 
theoreticians are guilty of appeasing the traditionalists. 
The new curriculum is wrongheaded, they say, because it 
relies on a "politics of coalitionism. . . an evasive 
political eclecticism and pluralism that avoid facing their 
own ideological complicity in perpetuating the regime of 
exploitation by reifying the subject as 'volunteer'" (24). 
It also "abandon[s] (post)modern theory in a desperate rush 
to re-legitimate thematics" (24). Most alarmingly, in their 
estimation, the new model 
represents the coalition that has recently formed 
in the (post)modern academy between traditionalists 
and (post)structuralists. [whose] political 
aim. . is ultimately to occlude the political 
economy of knowledge in late capitalism. (28) 
Among the tenets of the model that disturb Zavarzadeh and 
Morton the most are the author-centered course and the three 
categories that underpin the new curriculum: 
Some may suggest that it is a signal curricular 
change that students at Syracuse can now take 
Dickens without Dickens being a "required course": 
but is this what the much-discussed politics of 
canon-busting has come down to in the end?. 
As for the three basic categories used as the 
"template" of the new curriculum (history, theory, 
politics) . [they] behave in approved (post) 
structuralist fashion: they are reversible and 
emblemize the unending "play of signification." 
(28, 29) 
Their solution to this "new humanist program" is a "(post) 
modern subjectless humanities" (29). 
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While one may wonder what Zavarzadeh and Morton's ideal 
curriculum might actually look like (and what students might 
think about it), it is perhaps more important to notice that 
which they ignore: actual classroom practice and its theoret-
ical underpinnings. I wish to argue that simply substituting 
the theory upon which the traditional curriculum rests (what 
Zavarzadeh and Morton call "new humanism") with a new,theory 
(" (post)modernism") provides no structural change at all, 
merely a thematic one. Their description of the differences 
between a traditional humanist "interpretive essay" and a 
postmodern "critique" illustrates my point: 
[In a critique,] the learner recognizes close 
affinities between the way she reads a 
Shakespearean sonnet. . and the way she "reads" 
and understands events that take place in South 
Africa/Nicaragua/her domestic life. (7) 
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There are several disturbing implicit assumptions about peda-
gogy that must be noted. First, the authors ignore the ef-
fects of the teaching practices that presuppose any student 
writing. That is, if a student were taught that discerning 
the ideology operating within a text is crucial, "close 
affinities" between her interpretation of a sonnet and her 
understanding of apartheid might be duly noted, if only to 
earn a high grade from her teacher. Second, foregrounding 
these "close affinities" becomes the "right answer" to the 
assignment. What happens to the student who, try as he may, 
cannot discern any similarities between Shakespeare and Cen-
tral American opposition groups? Third, what results from 
Zavarzadeh and Morton's model, even from a "critique," is 
merely another interpretation that compares one text to an-
other (even if one or both aren't "literary"), a part of the 
traditional disciplinary project of producing readings, or, 
as they pejoratively refer to it, "the political economy of 
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knowledge in late capitalism" (28). Thus, a "(post)modern" 
curriculum, in their formulation, still functions in much the 
same structural way as the humanistic model they deplore. 
The present study will be developed in four chapters. 
Chapter 2 provides a brief cultural history of how what Fou-
cault calls "regimes of truth" - political, philosophical, 
economic and educational discourses that produce and natural-
ize certain truths about "what things mean" and "the way 
things are" - have suppressed possibilities for (self) 
critical thinking. Examples of these truths are the 
pragmatist idea that something is "true" if it "works" and 
the capitalist notion that "success" is a sign of "goodness." 
Working from the assumption that education is political, I 
concur with Foucault that 
the real political task in a society such as ours 
is to criticize the working of institutions which 
appear t~ be both neutral and independent; to 
criticize them in such a manner that the political 
violence which has always exercised itself 
obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that 
one can fight them. (qtd. in Rabinow 6) 
I argue that questioning the workings of institutions and the 
regimes of truth they construct could lead to what Foucault 
calls a "new politics of truth" or" (self) critical thinking." 
Chapter 2 also fashions the broad context for a more 
specific argument that follows. In Chapter 3, I argue that 
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New Criticism functions as a regime of truth for the dis-
cipline of English and that it is especially influential ped-
agogically. While historians of English have noted the New 
Criticism's legacy regarding scholarship, its influence on 
pedagogy has only been briefly treated; even these brief 
treatments have only concerned the teaching of literature, 
not composition. Through analysis of previous literary his-
torical work, literature and composition textbooks and stu-
dent responses about how they were taught English, I maintain 
that New Criticism - in its pedagogical forms - still 
functions as the "common sense" of the discipline to the 
detriment of students and teachers alike, buttressing the ra-
tionale for the (self)critical pedagogical ideas described in 
Chapter 4. 
Chapter 4 delineates both the "theory" and "practice," 
or praxis, behind (self) critical pedagogy. I articulate the 
theoretical underpinnings of (self)critical pedagogy and de-
scribe several ways I have approached teaching my own courses 
- as examples of (self)critical pedagogy - noting what seems 
to have worked, what didn't and possible future approaches. 
Chapter 5 reflects upon the efficacy of working toward a 
new pedagogy, noting the institutional and disciplinary road~ 
blocks to scholarly work about pedagogy and theory. I argue 
for pedagogy as a legitimate, if not the most crucial field 
for scholarship in English, as a subdiscipline that can work 
against the negative pedagogical consequences of the teach-
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ing/scholarship dichotomy that remain operative. 
For despite the useful and important work on rethinking 
and (re) theorizing pedagogy of the last 12-15 years, much re-
mains to be done, for several reasons. First, even though 
English might considered a theoretically progressive disci-
pline compared with other humanities fields, considerable an-
tipathy still exists to poststructuralist projects, as noted 
earlier. Second, scholarly work about pedagogy is also 
marginalized; it is thought to be a lesser enterprise than 
interpreting literary texts. The National Endowment for the 
Humanities, for example, does not fund pedagogical projects. 
Third, theoretical work on pedagogy presupposes a certain 
amount of self-reflection about the way one teaches; there-
fore, it is not recognizable and legitimated as the kind of 
"basic" work that English professors are supposed to be do-
ing. English teachers are widely viewed by the general pub-
lic as responsible for teaching students "how to write" and 
"objectively" passing down the traditions of literature, 
while scholars are assumed to be digging up new facts about 
old texts or making new interpretations. Devoting time and 
effort to reflection about the way one teaches is not a pub-
licly recognizable and valued project; if it is to be done at 
all, many think, education departments should handle it. 
But I think it is important to argue that critiquing the 
ways we teach/write/read/think to better understand why we do 
what we do and how we might do things differently to help our 
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students become (self)critical thinkers and citizens is not 
an activity that is secondary to "getting work done," to 
"producing knowledge." The alleged crises in education that 
have been widely publicized in the last few years have often 
been described in such economic terms; students aren't accu-
mulating enough knowledge to become productive citizens, so 
we teachers need to be more efficient, focusing on the basics 
- in English, the Great Books and writing for business. The 
real educational crisis, however, is treating education as a 
commodity subject to market forces, which is an approach that 
produces students and teachers who are discouraged from see-
ing the need to consider why they perform cognitively as they 
do. Chapter 2 suggests how we arrived at this condition. 
CHAPTER 2 
"WHY ASK WHY?": A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 
SUPPRESSION OF (SELF)CRITICAL THINKING 
[W]riting about American culture can still 
amount to what used to be called an un-Arnerican ac-
tivity. 
Andrew Ross, No Respect: Intellectuals 
and Popular Culture 
"Conservatives as well as radicals in education are pro-
foundly discontented with the present educational situation 
taken as a whole," John Dewey wrote in 1938 (Experience 89). 
Prescient as his words may seem today, they were not origi-
nal. Politics and education have always been intertwined, 
from the idea of the "philosopher-king" to the phenomenon of 
"political correctness." In America, however, the two have 
usually been thought to be best kept separate; the "partisan" 
nature of politics should be kept out of the "objective" pro-
cesses of education. 
Nevertheless, there is a widespread impression today 
that the intrusion of "politics" is a primary cause for 
"problems" in American education. Such criticism has come 
from both "inside" and "outside" the system. Former Yale 
University President Benno Schmidt accused some college 
teachers of "'trying to achieve political objectives'" in 
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their pedagogy (Worthington 19). A business and public pol-
icy professor at the University of California at Berkeley 
writes, "[T]he politicization of. . the classroom is 
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distorting the purpose of liberal education" (Vogel 19) 
Journalist and critic Roger Kimball states that "higher edu-
cation in this country has been transformed into a species of 
ideological indoctrination - a continuation of politics by 
other means" (20). To what extent these and other similiar 
critiques have affected public attitudes is of course argu-
ble, but their continued and widespread dissemination hints 
at the possibility of substantial influence. 
Those who disagree with such criticisms have fought back 
in several ways. They have responded in print in both aca-
demic and nonacademic venues; an organization of university 
professors, Teachers for a Democratic Culture, was formed to 
confront what its members felt were misleading characteriza-
tions of academia. However, this allegedly problematic con-
nection of politics with education also needs to be examined 
in broader historical and cultural contexts. Political cor-
rectness did not suddenly appear on American college campuses 
in the late 1980s; in many ways it is not a new phenomenon at 
all. It is, rather, a recurring educational "problem." 
While it would be difficult to find anyone opposed to "solv-
ing" "problems" in American education, I disagree with the 
assertion that "politicization" of college campuses is one of 
the problems. 
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Instead, what may "ail" higher education today (at least 
insofar as English is concerned) is a lack of disciplinary 
self-consciousness about the extent to which many teachers 
tend to rely (often unconsciously) on traditional pedagogical 
assumptions that were formed when student demographics were 
far less heterogenous. As John Mayher argues, there is a need 
to break out of "commonsensical" modes of thought about the 
teaching process, to "frame pedagogical problems in new ways" 
(9). Such reframing would attempt to move from an emphasis on 
"critical thinking" toward teaching, thinking, reading and 
writing that is (self)critical. But this movement toward 
(self)critical thinking must be preceded by two related cri-
tiques. One critique should attend to the traditional peda-
gogical assumptions mentioned above, noting their weaknesses 
and strengths. A second critique should concern how those 
assumptions may have developed from larger societal assump-
tions about the purposes of education, the nature and methods 
of interpretation, the roles of knowledge and "intellectu-
als," and the uses of lived experience. 
The latter critique, to be addressed in this chapter, 
begins with an argument proffered by the historian Richard 
Hofstadter in Anti-intellectualism in American Life (1963): 
that one hallmark of the intellectual and cultural history of 
America has been the repeated manifestation of what often has 
been called "anti-intellectualism." He defines the term as 
"a resentment and suspicion of the life of the mind and of 
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those who are considered to represent it; and a disposition 
constantly to minimize the value of that life" (7). Anti-in-
tellectualism, it seems, is again a significant force in cer-
tain cultural arenas, especially education. Academia, some 
say, has been overrun by leftist intellectuals who force 
their students to read politically correct, multicultural 
texts instead of the Great Books that traditional, "common-
sensical" teachers have assigned. 
However, this situation is not solely explained by anti-
intellectualism. It is reductive to say that the current 
perceived deficiencies in higher education stem from a sim-
ple, quintessentially American distrust of experts - and not 
only for the very reason that many of the most vociferous 
critics of education are "intellectuals" themselves. Rather, 
the alleged educational malaise may have more to do with the 
way capitalist societies function vis-a-vis the production of 
knowledge. In "Truth and Power," Foucault offers "a few 
propositions" about how "societies like ours" decide what 
counts as "knowledge" 
tion functions: 
which has much to do with how educa-
"Trutha is to be understood as a system of ordered 
procedures for the production, regulation, 
distribution, circulation and operation of 
statements. . "Truth" is linked in a circular 
relation with systems of power which produce and 
sustain it and to effects of power which it· 
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induces and which extends it. A "regime" of 
truth. . This regime is not merely ideological 
or superstructural; it was a condition of the 
formation and development of capitalism. (73, 74) 
The necessity for (self) critical thinking may be established 
in part by the premise that Americans - as subjects in/of a 
capitalist society - are (and have been) always already im-
plicated in a "regime of truth."6 Within a regime of truth, 
power is exercised through (at least) two nodes: "intellectu-
als," who ground cultural truths or, put another way, "what 
things mean" in art, literature, etc. and policy makers and 
business leaders, who ground political and economic truths 
or, in other words, that which is desirable - the "American 
Dream," for example. Most individuals therefore do not make 
decisions about the production of truth; instead they abide 
by, consume or are otherwise subject to truth. As a result, 
such subjection to truth suppresses (self)critical thinking, 
which may be likened to what Foucault calls "a new politics 
of truth" (74). That is, I do not theorize (self) critical 
thinking as that which "replaces" critical or some other kind 
of thinking; I am arguing that it is a mode of thought 
6 It should be noted that, although the focus of this disser-
tation is American education and culture, Foucault's ideas 
and extrapolations from them may well be "true" of other so-
cieties as well. Indeed, Foucault writes that "this same 
regime [of truth]. . . subject to certain modifications, op-
erates in the socialist countries (I leave open here the 
question of China, about which I know little)" ("Truth" 74). 
potentially operational in all subjects. Thus, the present 
study largely departs from the spirit of Hofstadter's, in 
which he theorizes anti-intellectualism a kind of cognitive 
deficiency that afflicts Americans periodically. As Foucault 
writes, 
The problem is not changing people's 
consciousnesses - or what's in their heads 
-- [it is to change] the political, economic, 
institutional regime of the production of truth 
[to] detach the power of truth from the 
forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, 
within which it operates at the present time. 
(74-75) 
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In other words, the goal of (self)critical pedagogy is not to 
change what students think; it is to uncover and make known 
the conditions of possibility that govern how they think, to 
encourage an awareness of how their attitudes, values and be-
liefs are not causes of particular actions, but rather ef-
fects of prior truths of which they may not be aware. (Self) 
critical thinking can result when subjects are encouraged to 
expose the forms of power that underpin regimes of truth, a 
process similar to what Freire calls "conscientization." 
A contemporary example of an attempt to suppress (self) 
critical thinking is the "Why ask why?" advertising slogan. 
The question seems to express implicitly a fear that Ameri-
cans might "ask why," think (self)critically, inquire 'into 
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the theoretical basis for some action or statement. The 
nature of the question as "rhetorical" also implies that it 
is not worthwhile or productive to "ask why," that it is 
better to accept the way things are. The slogan can be seen 
as an attempt to naturalize not asking why, to discourage 
(self)critical thinking. 
In this chapter, I will examine how various historical 
developments (or "statements," in Foucault's terminology) in 
American politics, philosophy, economics and education - our 
national cultural history - have functioned within their re-
spective regimes of truth to suppress (self) critical think-
ing. Though this history is brief, I am hopeful it will pro-
vide significant support for the general line of argument. I 
undertake this critique to set up a more specific argument in 
Chapter 3 about the role of English pedagogy in the sup-
pression of (self)critical thinking in students and teachers. 
The present critique shall begin with a brief look at ancient 
texts - the Phaedo and the Republic - that foreground perti-
nent issues about power and intellectual work. 
In the Phaedo, Socrates convinces Simmias that there is 
a distinction between the soul and the body: 
SOCRATES: Then, Simrnias, our souls must have also 
existed without bodies before they were in the 
form of man and must have had intelligence. 
SIMMIAS: Unless indeed you suppose, Socrates, that 
all such knowledge is given us at the very moment 
of birth; for this is the only time which remains. 
SOCRATES: Yes. but if so, when, pray, do we 
lose it? For it is not in us when we are born 
. Do we lose it at the moment of receiving 
it or if not at what other time? 
SIMMIAS: No, Socrates, I perceive that I am 
unconsciously talking nonsense. (Levison 73) 
Socrates subsequently extends his argument, arguing with 
Cebes for the connection of the soul/body dichotomy with the 
oppositions of unchanging/changing and unseen/seen (75-76) . 
These binaries are further advanced in the Republic, 
where Socrates bifurcates "knowledge" from "opinion" in his 
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conversation with Glaucon. Socrates describes knowledge as a 
"faculty" - "powers by which we do as we do" - like sight or 
hearing (254). Glaucon agrees that knowledge is a faculty, 
in fact, "the mightiest of all faculties" (255). Opinion, on 
the other hand, according to Glaucon, "is just that faculty 
whereby we are able to form an opinion" (255). Socrates then 
proceeds to raise the stakes: "Being is the sphere of knowl-
edge and the function of knowledge is to know the nature of 
being?" he asks. Glaucon assents: "[I]f difference in fac-
ulty implies difference in the sphere and if, as we say, 
opinion and knowledge are distinct faculties, then the sphere 
of knowledge and of opinion cannot be the same" (255). 
Socrates then applies the coup de grace: "Then if being is 
the sphere of knowledge, something other than being must be 
the sphere of opinion" (255, emphasis added). 
These exchanges in Plato founded an organization of 
concepts and principles, which have (consciously or 
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unconsciously) underpinned both scholarly and everyday 
discourse since antiquity: ideal/real, soul/body, unchanging/ 
changing, unseen/seen, being/nothingness, knowledge/opinion. 
This cognitive hierarchizing has produced insidious results, 
as David Marcell comments: 
[R]ationalism's dualism, primarily because of its 
conception of knowledge and truth as ab extra to 
human experience, had a paralytic effect on 
philosophy and on social and intellectual 
development generally. From the time of the 
Sophists, rationalism prevented men from going to 
their own experiences as the source of knowledge 
of the good and the true. 
culture's sacred cows. (255) 
. preserving 
The knowledge/opinion opposition is particularly important, 
for it is integral to the hegemony of virtually all 
discourse. To the extent that any discourse is ostensibly 
involved in the interpretation of objects of study, the con-
notations that stem from "knowledge" compared to mere "opin-
ion" separate "experts" from lay persons. Marcell notes that 
this dichotomy was an integral part of ancient societies such 
as Athenian Greece, "where a class of slaves did everyday, 
menial labor and a class of thus 'freed' citizens, priests 
and philosopher-statesmen could pursue knowledge of the ideal 
without having to involve themselves too intimately with com-
monplace concerns" (209). The scientific revolution of the 
16th through 18th centuries and the work of Francis Bacon 
were attempts to ameliorate the dichotomy, by validating 
man's experience to attempt to discover nature's laws. How-
ever, John Locke and other empiricists retained the notion 
that "man was still assumed to function within fixed laws, 
which derived from the original design and purpose of the 
universe's chief architect" (Marcell 213). As I will de-
scribe more fully, pragmatism's reaction to this, in Dewey's 
words, "mere" empiricism, would be a "radical" empiricism 
that would reverse the binary privileging experience and 
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opinion over fixed truths and knowledge - but continue to 
perpetuate its structure. Reading Plato to rediscover the 
knowledge/opinion binary sets up the arguments that follow, 
which suggest that the knowledge/opinion distinction - a 
regime of truth that overdetermines all others in the West 
goes a long way toward explaining how (self)critical thinking 
has been suppressed in America. 
One can begin by noting the intellectual circumstances 
surrounding America's founding, for "America" is at least as 
much an idea as it is a physical place. It is significant 
that those who first settled ]\merica were escaping "civiliza-
tion" - including the influence of (secular) intellectuals. 
The Puritans' evangelicalism and repudiation of European 
"decadence" were free to prosper in a frontier populated only 
by "savages"; Hofstadter considers the Puritans to be the 
first "anti-intellectuals" (49). The freedom from political 
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and intellectual oppression that characterized "the first 
Americans" fostered a sense of self-reliance, a quality that 
continues to be characterized as quintessentially American, 
having been disseminated in various guises ("common sense," 
"frugality," etc.) through such authors as Paine, Franklin 
and Emerson. More importantly, however, the legacy of early 
America, from the Puritans through colonial times, is one of 
intellect set in opposition to democracy, the former "as a 
quality which almost certainly deprives a man or woman of the 
common touch" (51). 
It is not surprising, therefore, that this opposition 
would come into play in a widely disseminated discourse -
presidential politics. The 1828 election, pitting Andrew 
Jackson against John Quincy Adams, was perhaps the first to 
be fashioned in these binary terms. While the fact that 
popular sentiment was against Adams because of his election 
as president by the House of Representatives in 1824 (despite 
Jackson's victory in the popular vote) was important, the 
issue of intellectualism was perhaps larger. Evidence of this 
includes the popular anti-Adams saying: "John Quincy Adams 
who can write/ And Andrew Jackson who can fight" (159). 
Hofstadter writes: 
The main case made by Jackson's spokesmen against 
Adams was that he was self-indulgent and 
aristocratic and lived a life of luxury. [But] 
what is most relevant here [is that] his learning 
and political training were charged up not as 
compensating virtues but as additional vices. 
(160) 
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More than simple anti-intellectualism, this is an example of 
marshaling the knowledge/opinion binary to obfuscate a polit-
ical decision and discourage the electorate from thinking 
(self) critically about the situation. Hofstadter views the 
Jackson/Adams race as a battle of the upper "writing" class 
versus the low/middle "fighting" class, accepts this opposi-
tion as commonsensical and natural, and sees it as the elec-
torate's reasoning for picking Jackson. But it is signifi-
cant, I think, that the above slogan, one might notice, co-
heres grammatically with an "and" - not an "or." One might 
say, then, that the slogan, although seemingly pejorative of 
Adams, was not a metaphor for the public's political deci-
sion-making process. Their opposition to Adams may have been 
more pragmatic; writing, an activity for the learned, was a 
luxury, while fighting was perhaps an economic necessity. 
That is to say, the electorate may have decided that the 
fighter Jackson was a better choice to address their immedi-
ate concerns than the writer Adams, a decision made at the 
expense of more self-conscious reflection about long-term 
needs. (The near destruction of the White House during Jack-
son's inaugural "open house" may serve as a metaphor.) 
By the late 19th century, the always already present 
disjuncture between "intellectual" knowledge and 
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"commonsensical" opinion in American cultural and political 
discourse was widened through the increasing use of dualistic 
labels, the legacy of which fuels conservative/liberal name-
calling today. The terms "individualist" and "paternalist" 
became part of common parlance, respectively referring to 
corporate self-sufficiency (a business functioning as a self-
reliant "individual") and government intrusion (the stern 
father regulating the corporate "individual" too much) (Green 
24). Individualism/paternalism soon took on connotations of 
intellectualism. Individualism was good, American and 
commonsensical, while paternalism was bad, European and 
intellectually based (27). This dichotomy can only be 
sustained, as Green notes, by a xenophobia that seems to be 
yet another Puritan legacy: 
Both before and since the Bolsheviks, Americans 
have feared "socialism" and "communism" as alien, 
European things. That the two words have 
historically been such powerful pejoratives 
derives not from their precision of meaning or 
from any widespread public understanding of Marx, 
but from their emotional connotations as symbols 
of an alien culture. (29) 
Ironically, though, those opponents of big-business interests 
(Andrew Carnegie et al.) who were labeled "paternalists" 
found themselves, just before and around the turn of the 
century, newly cast as overly "feminine." In the early 1880s 
battle over civil-service reform, the intellectualism 
question again was raised: 
The professional politicians succeeded in 
persuading themselves that civil-service reform 
meant favoritism to the college-educated; that it 
would restrict job-holding to a hereditary 
college-educated aristocracy; and that all kinds 
of unreasonable and esoteric questions would be 
asked on civil-service examinations. (Hofstadter 
184) 
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President Chester Arthur feared that the civil-service exams 
would favor "'mere intellectual proficiency'" over other tal-
ents (185). These reformers, who were more highly educated 
than the career politicians they were criticizing, soon came 
under fire for their supposed inability to operate in the 
"masculine" world of politics. 
This characterization, deriving quite directly from pre-
vailing popular assumptions about women, the "feminine" 
sphere and the inherent masculine bias of "self-reliance," 
foregrounded a troubling gender ideology at work in the Amer-
ican knowledge/opinion dualism. Hofstadter states: "[T]he 
politicians argued that culture is impractical and men of 
culture are ineffectual, that culture is feminine and culti-
vated men tend to be effeminate" (186). Late-19th-century 
politicians managed to align the opposition of mascu-
line/feminine with the knowledge/opinion binary. That the 
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reformers did not question the hierarchizing - they tried 
only to show they weren't "feminine" intellectuals - demon-
strates the hegemony of the knowledge/opinion opposition 
within the regime of political truth. The use of these dual-
istic labels, naturalized into everyday discourse, functioned 
to suppress (self)critical impulses to question them. 
This may have allowed for the emergence of a president 
Theodore Roosevelt - whose campaign explicitly thematized the 
masculine/feminine opposition. Hofstadter writes, 
A recruit from the same social and educational 
strata as the reform leaders, he decided at an 
early age that the deficiencies charged against 
them were real and that if reform was to get 
anywhere, their type must be replaced by a new and 
more vigorous kind of leader. ( 191) 
His constant references to "manly men" and "the strenuous 
life" attributed masculine qualities to the Republican party, 
while casting Democrats as overly intellectual, effete and 
"feminine" - characterizations that remain with us today.7 
On the positive "American" side are self-reliance, individu-
alism, big business, democracy, masculinity and commonsensi-
cal opinion. On the negative anti-American or "European" 
7 Sidney Blumenthal traces this phenomenon from Lyndon John-
son to the 1988 presidential campaign, with George Bush's at-
tempt to avoid the "wimp" label and Michael Dukakis' por-
trayal as a "soft," New England intellectual technocrat. See 
"The Testosterone Factor," Gentleman's Quarterly, Feb. 1992, 
pp. 131, 134-37. 
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side are paternalism, socialism, feminism and intellectual-
ism. Naturalized in everyday discourse, these binary con-
structions are an integral component of the regime of politi-
cal truth; the questioning of these oppositions is discour-
aged if not suppressed. Today, "politically correct" aca-
demics and "left-wing" political candidates are summarily 
dismissed as "radical" and "out of the mainstream." 
Andrew Carnegie's legacy - specifically, the association 
of business interests with democratic American common sense 
fueled the ideologically conservative regime of political 
truth into the 20th century. The election of Robert LaFol-
lette as governor of Wisconsin in 1900 provides compelling 
evidence. The election of LaFollette - a left-leaning uni-
versity professor - inaugurated a theory that the increasing 
complexity of problems facing governments could be amelio-
rated by university-trained experts. Business interests in 
the state - who fashioned themselves as "conservatives," in 
Carnegie's terminology - became convinced that the university 
was part of a conspiracy against them (Green 38; Hofstadter 
202) . Intellectuals like LaFollette were seen a threat to 
commonsensical businessmen like Carnegie's followers. Theo-
dore Roosevelt, caught between his intellectual beginnings 
and a populist political career, was trapped in a quandary 
that Woodrow Wilson exploited, proclaiming, following 
LaFollette, that Republicans (and Roosevelt's Bull Moose 
followers) had become slaves to big business and 
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industrialists like Carnegie. Wilson pronounced conserva-
tives defenders of "special privilege" and captives of 
"private monopolies" (Green 75). This view prompted many 
attacks; perhaps Wilson's most assiduous critic was the 
literary critic Randolph Bourne, who lambasted Wilson and his 
"liberal intellectual" followers for their support of World 
War I. David Green notes that 
Bourne underscored the incongruity of talking about 
"liberty" and supporting a policy that rested on 
massive coercive authority. What was at fault, he 
concluded, was the very idea that a coercive 
process such as war could be used to "liberate" 
society. ( 83) 
Bourne also attacked his mentor, John Dewey (who strongly 
supported the war), for this seeming contradiction. Bourne 
might be considered a (self) critical thinker in this regard, 
for he seemed to recognize the incongruities of the politi-
cal posturing and labeling, how even "liberals" were impli-
cated in the regime of political truth whose aims were more 
to defeat conservatives and maintain power than to work for 
"liberty." But Bourne's news were suppressed then and they 
are but a footnote in Amer~can history now. 
The years that followed - through Hoover's conservatism 
into Franklin Roosevelt's "liberal" New Deal - provide more 
evidence of how the regime of political truth continued to 
suppress (self) critical thinking and how its influence can be 
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seen as more far-reaching than mere anti-intellectualism. If 
anti-intellectualism by itself could explain this regime, the 
New Deal would have never occurred, since its ideology was 
theorized by university professors (Hofstadter 214). How-
ever, in the wake of the Depression and the widely perceived 
failure of Hoover's administration, the "natural" dislike of 
knowledge-holders was set aside for pragmatic ends, primarily 
mass government employment. Roosevelt convinced the public 
that it was the government's duty to intervene to solve na-
tional problems and affixed the term "liberal" to such inter-
ventions (Green 119). Traditional interpretations of the New 
Deal state that Americans wholeheartedly embraced it.8 But 
what seems to have happened, one might say, is that the prac-
tice of the New Deal was accepted, but its theory was not. 
For when Roosevelt invoked the liberal label, he set it in 
opposition to "conservative," which he associated with lais-
sez-faire industrialism. However, the regime of political 
truth holding sway still promoted the connection of the 
8 Offering a contrasting view, Stephanie Coontz argues that 
the New Deal "related to men as if they were all independent 
wage earners in the market and to women as if they were all 
dependent caregivers in the family. Rejecting citizen enti-
tlements, such as universal medical insurance, New Dealers 
preferred measures such as workmen's compensation, which was 
tied to previous participation and remuneration in the labor 
market. Such wage-based welfare measures perpetuated dis-
crimination against women (and minorities), who tended to 
have more difficulty persisting in the work force and ascend-
ing a job ladder that gave them wages high enough to exist on 
the fraction of the salary provided by unemployment compensa-
tion." See The Way We Never Were: American Families and the 
Nostalgia Trap (Basic Books, 1992), p. 138. 
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conservative label to positive concepts like self-reliance 
and democracy (124). Consequently, after the New Deal public 
works projects were finished, "liberalism" waned drastically 
and "the notion bfi!came widely current that the professors 
were running things," a negative impression of the govern-
ment World War II only exacerbated (Hofstadter 217). 
"Liberalism" continued to take a beating after the war, 
with Joseph McCarthy's "conservative" anti-communism besting 
Harry Truman's avowed liberalism. Truman's critics (notably 
Hoover and his protege Robert Taft) managed to so reinforce 
the connection of the term with socialism and communism 
(pitting "European" against "American" values once again) 
that rarely has it been considered positive since, with Lyn-
don Johnson's Great Society a brief exception that suffered 
much the same fate as the New Deal (Green 195). 
Moreover, Truman's critics significantly influenced the 
1952 presidential election. Though Dwight Eisenhower's popu-
larity as a war hero might have overwhelmed any Democratic 
nominee, Adlai Stevenson's candidacy was doomed also by his 
popularity with intellectuals and liberals. Stevenson's 
tenure at the Harvard Law School, his open, enthusiatic sup-
port by university groups (such as a large number of Columbia 
University faculty who also denigrated Eisenhower) and his 
civilian service in both world wars prompted characteriza-
tions of him as an effeminate intellectual. His critics re-
inforced this at every opportunity: "The New York Daily News 
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descended to calling him Adelaide and charged that he 
'trilled' his speeches in a 'fruity' voice" (Hofstadter 227). 
"'A vote for Eisenhower, the plain American,'" one Midwest-
ern newspaper stated, "'is a vote for democracy'" (226). 
Familiar dualistic labels notwithstanding, Stevenson's 
main problem was the perception of his message as leftist, 
intellectually based and overly theorized compared with 
Eisenhower's pragmatic, "middle-of-the-road" approach. Eisen-
hower ostensibly abandoned conservative/liberal labeling 
(though its connotations helped elect him) in favor of "the 
middle," or "anti-extremism" (Green 216). Anti-extremism as 
an idea and label was one-half of an extremely functional di-
chotomy. Its opposite, extremism, could be used to castigate 
anyone who disagreed with Eisenhower's approach and quickly 
was added into the regime's list of negative concepts. 
The effects of this political pragmatism were far-reach-
ing. Even "intellectuals" themselves lent credence to the 
middle-of-the-road approach. In 1955, Columbia University 
sociologist Daniel Bell published an anthology of essays ex-
tolling the virtues of anti-extremism, The New American 
Right, which included writings by Hofstadter, a historian at 
Columbia (Green 231). Green argues that this way of thinking 
left its supporters unprepared for the social extremism of 
the 1960s (239). The Vietnam War, however, functioned to 
rescue anti-extremism from turbulent times; it "evolved as a 
'middle of the road' or 'moderate' approach to fighting 
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Pragmatism may have been particularly well suited for having 
such effects upon American subjects, for it appealed to 
"American" attitudes and modes of thought; it was presented 
as anti-European, anti-intellectual and anti-metaphysical. 
William James' definition of pragmatism - "[tlhe attitude of 
looking away from first things. principles. 'categories.' 
supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, 
fruits, consequences, facts" is direct criticism of tenets 
of traditional philosophy such as Platonic "categories" and 
"principles" and "necessities" of Aristotelian argumentation 
( 32) . Cornel West gives a broader context to pragmatism's 
aims and significance: "American pragmatism is less a philo-
sophical conversation putting forward solutions to perennial 
problems. . and more a continuous cultural commentary or 
set of interpretations that attempt to explain America to it-
self at a particular historical moment" (American 5). 
Pragmatism moved philosophy from a fixation on the metaphysi-
cal to a concentration on the physical, from purely theoreti-
cal speculation to practical application. 
Many have argued pragmatism has succeeded in exactly 
that way; West maintains it is "the most influential stream 
in American thought" - as a "non-philosophy" in a society of 
"non-philosophers" (212). Precisely because of its influ-
ence, I wish to argue that particular moments in its texts 
support the suppression of (self)critical thinking. But this 
is not to say that pragmatism causes such a suppression. 
58 
James' project of focusing on consequences (instead of 
first principles) and the contingency of truth (rather than 
its alleged metaphysical quality), insofar as it is an aban-
donment of foundationalism, the truth of the classical Euro-
pean philosophical regime, is laudable. For example, his 
emphasis on abandoning the "inveterate habits dear to profes-
sional philosophers" upholds the knowledge/opinion opposition 
(James 31). "A pragmatist," he writes, 
turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, 
from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, 
from fixed principles, closed systems and pretended 
absolutes and origins. He turns toward concrete-
ness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action 
and towards power. (31) 
The distinctions James draws between the pragmatist and the 
"professional philosopher" resemble those between the non-in-
tellectual and the intellectual. Intellectuals, so the 
stereotype goes, don't worry about potential repercussions, 
for "they are too busy perfecting their "formal knowledge and 
expertise" (Hofstadter 19). Envisioning practical conse-
quences is the forte of, as Hofstadter puts it with insuffi-
cient irony, "the common man"; it exhibits his "plain sense" 
(19). As noted earlier, to be an "impractical" intellectual 
around the turn of the century was to be an agent of protest, 
anti-business and anti-American (Hofstadter 38). Gerald 
Graff notes that some intellectuals in academia around this 
time did nothing to dispel this notion, invoking Arnoldian 
rhetoric in their disdain for the public: "Scholars spoke of 
'the complacent attitude of the contented Philistine toward 
the scholar, as though the latter were not more than a half-
man and by no means to be taken seriously.' They deplored 
the 'vast and growing ignorance' that 'pervades society'" 
(Professing 115). 
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James' emphasis on the contingency of truth may also be 
seen as upholding the intellectual/non-intellectual and re-
lated dichotomies. He writes: 
[A]ny idea that will carry us prosperously from 
any one part of our experience to any other part, 
linking things satisfactorily, working securely, 
simplifying, saving labor; is true for just so 
much, true in so far [it is set] forth, true in-
strumentally. This is the "instrumental" view of 
truth. • . the view that truth in our ideas means 
their power to "work". ( 34) 
James implies that truth is a personal matter and what is 
"true" is that which is functional, contrary to what profes-
sional philosophers have always said. Another form of this 
reasoning is voiced by students who claim that their opinions 
on given subjects are "true" because they believe them. How-
ever, such reasoning has the potential to suppress a wider 
conception of the power of truth - for example, a recognition 
of "the status of those who are charged with saying what 
counts as true" (Foucault "Truth" 73). James further sup-
ports this reasoning when he writes that, "New truth is al-
ways a go-between, a smoother-over of transitions. It mar-
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ries old opinion to new fact so as ever to show a minimum of 
jolt, a maximum of continuity" (35). This emphasis on "opin-
ion" and "fact" - rather than "knowledge" and "theory" 
shows James figuring his ideas as "non-intellectual" and per-
petuating the dichotomy. 
How some of John Dewey's work underpins the regime of 
philosophical truth is more complex. In its role as the 
theoretical basis for child-centered education, Deweyan 
pragmatism would seem to be the result of careful reflection 
upon the nature and processes of education - that students 
should be central to the theory and practice of American 
schooling. How then, one might ask, can moments in Dewey's 
work be seen as potentially complicitous in the suppression 
of (self) critical thinking? This question may be addressed 
in two ways. 
First, there is Dewey's emphasis on "progress" and 
"growth" and his steadfast belief that "science" could serve 
as the vehicle for both. Like James, he considered tradi-
tional philosophy a failure, but his critique exceeded 
James'. Following James, Dewey maintained philosophy's pre-
occupation with metaphysical questions was unproductive; it 
was "circular" and "disputatious," its "schools" "arguing the 
same questions" that "still divided" them "much as they were 
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in the times of the Greeks" ("Philosophy" 842). But he also 
felt that philosophy failed in its blindness to "changing 
realities in the external world" - burgeoning industrial-
ization and "progressive" scientific thinking (Marcell 206) 
Education, he argued, should be similarly "progressive" and 
"rational," using the scientific method as a structural 
guide. A problem, however, is that Dewey's vision of what 
West calls a "functionalistic education," one "that combined 
autonomy with intelligent and flexible guidance, relevance 
with rigor and wonder," can also be seen as a simply "func-
tional" training that merely "adjust[ed] one to the labor 
market possibilities" (84). William Andrew Paringer states, 
"[T]he instrumental needs of a rapidly growing economy re-
quired the concomitant development of a citizenry who would 
either appreciate or acquiesce to those needs" (9). While it 
may be argued that Dewey did not have in mind the training of 
workers for easy admittance into the capitalist system and 
regimes of truth, the strains of functionalism and scientism 
in his pragmatism lend themselves to this kind of (mis)use. 
Second, because of their easy cooptation by business and 
technocratic interests, many of Dewey's ideas can be invoked 
in the name of commonsensical, American, democratic, individ-
ualist growth. In his later work, Dewey chastised those whom 
he considered to misuse his work - both technocrats and 
"child-centered romantics," who "call[ed] upon [him] only for 
that part of his thought that supported their own partial 
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views" (West 84; Berlin Rhetoric 59). Hofstadter argues that 
Dewey's appropriation by groups with radically different ide-
ologies is due in part to his obtuse writing style (367). 
However, a more compelling argument is that Dewey's preferred 
labels for his work - "democratic" and "scientific" - were 
sufficiently vague and so firmly established in everyday dis-
course as positive terms that there was no perceived contra-
diction in opposing ideological groups using the same Deweyan 
concepts. As Paringer notes, a concept like "democracy" can 
be used easily to "ignore or conceal the social contradic-
tions in American society" (19). The middle-of-the-roadism 
that was the hallmark of pragmatism also contributed to 
Dewey's cooptation through a word like democracy: he 
never problematized "democracy." It was never a 
question of "do I fight?" or "do I flee?," but "how 
do I accommodate?" By assuming a pragmatic stance, 
he was philosophically wedded to that which already 
existed (American democracy) . . he took for 
granted. its [democracy's] internal hierar-
chies. (52) 
Though I will argue in Chapter 4 that the "very late" Dewey -
in 1938's Experience and Education - is a different case (and 
even somewhat Foucauldian), Dewey's earlier work tends to 
lend itself to a perpetuation of "the way things are" and re-
inforces the power of American regimes of truth. 
The most prominent pragmatist in America today, however, 
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making sure that individuals hurt one another as little as 
possible and interfere minimally in the private life of each" 
(541). This goal is accomplished through such conceptual 
means as "solidarity," "community," "consensus" and "conver-
sation. 11 Our worldly troubles, Rorty posits, are due to "the 
disappearance of human solidarity" in a postmodern age 
("Method" 207). Our hope for solutions lies in "bourgeois 
liberalism," of which "Deweyan pragmatism" is the finest 
example (207). This state of liberalism can be achieved 
through a "quest" for "the consensus of a community" ("Soli-
darity" 17) based on "conversation," amongst "nations" and 
our American "fellow citizens" ("Postmodernist" 588). This 
"pragmatic framework establishes both the means and dis-
position to foster. . compromise. which [is] necessary 
for the strength of democracy" (Bullert 208). Throughout his 
work, Rorty argues our society needs only "loyalty to itself" 
- its sense of community on the basis of democratic soli-
darity and consensus - to legitimate itself, not some 
"ahistorical backup" such as absolute truth or morality 
("Postmodernist" 585). 
Rorty's pragmatism has been criticized on several ac-
counts. Paringer considers him to be overly idealistic and 
uncritical; on the notions of "solidarity" and "consensus," 
Paringer writes, "Yes, 'cooperation' is desirable and a fun-
damental human quality to nurture, but when it is not in 
evidence, why not? What inhibits it?" (123). West considers 
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Rorty's work apolitical: "What are the ethical and political 
consequences of his neopragmatism?. [T]here simply are 
none" (206). Both see Rorty's work as providing "moral dex-
terity" for the capitalist West to do as it pleases, while it 
hopes that life will improve for those subject to the conse-
quences of the its actions (Westbrook 206). 
Most pertinent, however, is West's statement that 
Rortyian pragmatism "requires no change in our cultural and 
political practices" (206). This is not surprising in a way, 
since James attempted to found pragmatism as a kind of non-
philosophy, as a movement that would not dictate subject mat-
ter to its adherents (the search for truth, etc.). But in 
Jamesian pragmatism, one had to pay lip service to what might 
happen if a particular choice were undertaken. For Rorty, 
that brief moment of reflection is unnecessary; there is lit-
tle cause for thinking about why particular decisions are be-
ing made and what the consequences might be. 
Pragmatism as a whole, from James to Dewey to Rorty, has 
the potential to rationalize the status quo (whatever it is 
at a given historical moment) through its drive for ameliora-
tion. Similar to the use of dualisms in political discourse, 
pragmatism's functionality in regimes of truth lies in its 
apparent lack of reliance on intellectuals and "professional 
philosophers," in its blend of democratic consensus-building 
(in Graff's terms, "agreeing to disagree") and commonsensical 
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practicality (a "see-if-it-works" notion, as Paul Berman puts 
it) ( "Teach" 6 6; Berman 1 7) . Pragmatism's radical initial 
impact and commitment to social justice are thus endangered 
by the possibility of codifying pragmatism into what West 
calls "a crude anti-theoreticism," the belief that the imag-
ining of consequences can supplant the theorizing of specific 
social practices (209). Pragmatism was theorized as "a phi-
losophy of present experience," eliminating the need for the-
oretical reflection (Paringer 39). As Foucault warns us, 
"the analysis of actual experience is a discourse of mixed 
nature"; it can end up "doing no more. than fulfilling 
the demands laid down when the attempt was made to make the 
empirical, in man, stand for the transcendental" (Order 321) 
Pragmatism, in certain instances, "posit[s] that the evidence 
given us by our sensations. . is a pure and entirely trust-
worthy source of information about the world" (Crowley 
Teacher's 11) . 
Having examined the influence of regimes of political 
and philosophical truth in suppressing (self)critical think-
ing, the American regime of economic truth - capitalism -
must be considered as well. Being in the "mainstream" of 
American thinking has always been "profitable"; to be "lib-
eral" or "extreme" or "intellectual" has meant losing elec-
tions, reputations and money - crucial components for iden-
tity formation in a capitalist society. Written into this 
socioeconomic text, -Americans traditionally have accepted, to 
67 
a significant extent, "the way things are" as the way they 
should be, merely to be able to live a materially decent 
life. This is not to say that Americans have not been 
amenable to "change," but that regimes of truth have die-
tated that such change will issue from the proper individuals 
or groups and fall within commonsensical strictures of 
thought - e.g. replacing Democrats with Republicans or vice 
versa without seriously considering candidates with alterna-
tive points of view. Not thinking (self)critically to ques-
tion the status quo may have begun with the "religious belief 
in prosperity as a sign of godliness" of the Puritans that 
has metamorphosed into a "secular variant" in America: 
namely, "The chief sign of goodness is success" (Taylor 267). 
This "what works is good" mentality seems to be especially 
necessary, I would argue, in this period of postmodernity.9 
Francois Lyotard's formulation that postmodernity is 
characterized by a loss of faith in "master narratives" (God, 
Truth, etc.)10 misses what seems to me to be an inescapable 
effect of the regimes of truth that govern America today: 
that because of what Fredric Jameson has termed the 
"schizophrenia" of postmodern life, subjects seek master 
narratives all the more strongly ("Consumer" 119). The rise 
9 Again I use "postmodernity" to refer to our late 20th-cen-
tury historical period, in contrast to "postmodernism," 
which signifies the cultural practices of postmodernity. 
10 See The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, 
trans. Geoff Bennington. (U of Minnesota P, 1984). 
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of religious fundamentalisms, the call for "back-to-basics" 
education, the focus of political discourse on "family 
values," the resurgence of identity politics - all indicate a 
general yearning for certainty in uncertain times, for a 
"referent" that "no longer exists" (Postmodernism 277). 
There is, I believe, a strong correlation between our "throw-
away style of life, in which everything which surrounds us 
suffers perpetual obsolescence" and the suppression of 
(self) critical thinking (Taylor 251). "Individuality" a 
supposed bedrock of American democracy - disappears in a 
world where everything and everyone is bought and sold. 
People feel the "terror o.f imminent anonymity," the 
"experience of isolated, disconnected, discontinous material 
signifiers" (Jameson Postmodernism 358; "Consumer" 119). 
Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that Rorty resorts to 
moral passivity and self-justification, saying, "[W]e should 
be more willing than we are to celebrate bourgeois capitalist 
society as the best polity actualized so far, while regret-
ting that it is irrelevant to most of the problems of most of 
the population of the planet" ("Method" 210). 
Political, philostiphical and economic regimes of truth 
suppressing (self) critical thinking - especially the discour~ 
agement of questioning the connections of "growth" and "busi-
ness" with "progress" and "democracy" - have provided the 
conditions for this sense of growing commodification, of 
dehumanization, largely through their effects on education. 
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Ira Shor points out the symbiotic relationship between tradi-
tional education and American capitalism: 
If masses of students succeeded in school and col-
lege, the economic system could not possibly meet 
their expectations. The traditional curriculum 
. is a program structured to produce the high 
degree of failure that relieves the unequal 
economic system of the need to reward amass of 
high-achieving graduates. To maintain inequality, 
the system needs a limited number of individuals 
who climb up and are certified for success, along 
with a mass of people certified as mediocre and 
blaming themselves for their own failures. 
(Empowering 10) 
Or as Michael Ryan puts it, "Even two opposed groups - radi-
cal teachers and business technocrats - hold the same view of 
the university. . that the university services capitalism 
by providing it with trained manpower, technology and new 
knowledge" (45). This process was bolstered by the rise of 
vocationalism or "career education" in the early 1970s. For 
example, Shor writes, the "authorization of $850 million in 
1972 for occupational programs at the community college alone 
was three times the entire allocation made for capital con-
struction on two-year campuses" (Culture 52). Having demon-
strated their "extremism" and "anti-American" attitudes 
during 1960s war protests, those in the liberal arts and hu-
manities saw their departments "shrivel in size and pres-
tige," their possibility for promoting (self) critical modes 
of thought dashed by their perceived lack of practical, com-
monsensical middle-of-the-roadism (52). 
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A current effect of the suppression of (self)critical 
thinking - the "political correctnes~" controversy - exhibits 
how many of the arguments and labels that historically have 
been used to dichotomize and hierarchize cultural issues are 
still operable. An examination of the PC conundrum reveals 
many of the same qualities that characterized previous polit-
ical/ cultural controversies. To be PC is to be intellectual, 
liberal, extreme, theoretical and feminist. Those who al-
legedly uphold "freedom of speech" against PC "tyranny" are 
populist, more conservative, pragmatic, practical and, while 
not always overtly anti-women, certainly not "feminists." As 
a war of labels, PC obfuscates the battle over political 
power that it really is. PC is not about "freedom of 
speech"; it is about conservatives who "sought - and still 
seek - ascendancy," who wanted "conservative curricula" 
(Kelner 38). It is not about "tenured radicals" from the 60s 
indoctrinating students with leftist ideas. Rather, as Bar-
bara Ehrenreich recently wrote, PC is the new "evil, all-pow-
erful ideological enemy" of the "American right," replacing 
European/Soviet communism (333). Unable to find Marxists 
abroad to battle, the political right found some in academia 
- as they did during McCarthyism. 
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The pedagogical problem here is the widespread accep-
tance of PC as a pejorative: "[M]ost folks now believe we 
brainwash our students by feeding them sixties radicalism 
alongside what one New Republic commentator calls 'warmed-
over Nietzcheanism, ' thus turning them into agents of polit-
ical correctness" (Berube 126-27). As I argued in Chapter 1, 
the remedy is not more "corporate visibility" for English. 
The suppression of (self) critical thinking makes possible the 
conditions for a populist backlash given the right issue -
such as one relating to "intellectuals." This is not the 
same thing, however, as saying "Americans are anti-intellec-
tual." I am suggesting that the influence of several regimes 
of power makes the criticism of intellectuals productive - to 
get published, to win elections, etc. It allows one to ap-
peal to a basic desire for simplicity in a world in flux, to 
stand for simple, certain "truths" that intellectuals often 
dismiss as naive. 
Within English, the desire for certainty was no less 
strong. By the 1930s, the discipline was "groping for a 
principle of order" (Graff Professing 145). Disparate kinds 
of scholarship - philological, historical, psychoanalytic, 
Marxist - were hindering English professors' ability to 
transmit the true meanings of the classics to an ever-growing 
student body: "the need arose for a simplified pedagogy 
isolat[ing] literature as an autonomous mode of 
discourse with its own special 'mode of existence,' distinct 
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from that of philosophy, politics, and history" (145). 
In the next chapter, I will argue that this "New Criti-
cism" succeeded so wildly that it became the common sense of 
the discipline and survives quite nicely today as a default 
mechanism for any attempt at revisionary pedagogy; it is what 
one "falls back on" if trying something "different" doesn't 
"work" in the classroom. New Criticism's steady gaze on the 
"text itself" (and the pedagogy that results from this empha-
sis) will be critiqued as a form of hegemony that suppresses 
students' and teachers' (self)critical impulses. 
CHAPTER 3 
SUPPRESSING (SELF)CRITICAL THINKING IN THE ENGLISH 
DEPARTMENT: NEW CRITICISM AS PEDAGOGICAL COMMON SENSE 
No historical lesson has been taken from the suc-
cess of the New Critics. 
Susan Miller, Textual Carnivals: 
the Politics of Composition 
One adopts measures in keeping with his past train-
ing - and the very soundness of this training may 
lead him to adopt the wrong measures. 
Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change 
The general effects of the subjectivity fostered by any 
English pedagogical orientation should not be underestimated. 
Susan Miller and Evan Watkins, among others, have argued that 
English is more widely influential than one might think. 
Watkins writes, 
English is ar•Juably the most important discipline 
. because it is perceived and educationally 
situated to operate "non-specifically." For with 
the exception of working in an English department 
yourself, English doesn't train you for a specific 
job; rather, it measures your level of general 
"cultural skills" available for transfer elsewhere, 
into a specific sector. . English is the· 
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largest discipline that operates in these terms. 
Unlike the other humanities, English in some form 
is represented at every level of education. (205) 
The institutional site of English guarantees that a substan-
tial number of Americans experience the consequences of its 
pedagogy. 
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I will argue in this chapter that the consequences of 
conventional English pedagogy contributes significantly to 
the suppression of (self)critical thinking and constructs 
subjects who, as William Cain puts it, are "at a total loss" 
not only when they are asked to respond critically to litera-
ture, but also when they are asked to speak "in a critically 
informed manner about their politics, attitudes toward his-
tory, and 'awareness of the environment' in which they live" 
(119). More specifically, I will examine the complicity of 
New Criticism in this process and how its pedagogical mani-
festations have become naturalized as "commonsensical" teach-
ing practices, or, as Susan Miller puts it, "institutional 
habits" (2). Through an examination of previous disciplinary 
historical work, literature and composition handbooks and an-
thologies, student reactions, and personal experiences as 
both a teacher and a student, I will present a rationale for 
a pedagogy of (self) critical thinking. 
Cain and Graff have described how New Criticism was in 
stitutionalized as disciplinary common sense. But critics 
have only briefly addressed the specific pedagogical 
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consequences of this phenomenon. They have mainly emphasized 
the hegemony of New Criticism over literary scholarship and 
teaching literature in general. Concerning the former, they 
believe that New Criticism was a necessary historical cor-
rective for literary studies. Graff notes that though New 
Criticism may seem theoretically unsophisticated today to 
some, "in its time the movement stood for theoretical reflec-
tion against the primitive accumulation of data" (Professing 
247). Cain writes that "[t]he New Criticism made a necessary 
case against the bad effects of a certain kind of excessively 
'historical' approach, and in this sense it was truly liber-
ating" (111). While these statements are generally true, 
questions remain: Theoretical reflection about what? Liber-
ating for whom? Graff and Cain inadequately focus on these 
issues of pedagogical legacy, especially New Criticism's ef-
fects on composition instruction. 
Critics such as Hugh Kenner and Robert Scholes have 
sensed this; they combine Watkins' argument about the perva-
siveness and consequences of English with a realization of 
New Criticism's pedagogical legacy. In 1976, Kenner wrote: 
There seem to be no New Critics in business today 
[T]hey are extinct for the same reason that 
the unicorn is ~xtinct. Expeditions find no uni-
corns because none have existed. It is arguable 
that the New Criticism had little to do with 
literary criticism but much to do with the teaching 
of literature. (36-37) 
Scholes also notes how New Criticism has been more than sim-
ply a literary theory: 
Try to imagine the New Critical revolution. 
without Undekstanding Poetry and countless other 
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textbooks that both changed classroom practice and 
provided financial rewards for those who developed 
effective vehicles in which to distribute the tenor 
of New Critical ideas. (18) 
It remains difficult to find many English scholars who iden-
tify themselves as New Critics (or deconstructionists for 
that matter); categorization seems to be out of vogue - which 
is not necessarily a bad thing. But Kenner's argument con-
curs with Cain's - and accurately reflects, it seems to me, 
the current pedagogical condition in that New Criticism was 
from its inception a pedagogical as well as a literary theory 
and that "its power is so pervasive that we are ordinarily 
not even aware of it" (Cain 105). I want to suggest that to 
try to teach (self)critically, one must become as aware as 
possible of its pervasiveness. I will turn first to its in-
fluence on literary pedagogy. 
An interesting incongruity that exists between "litera-
ture" and "composition" as subdisciplines of English is the 
choice of adjective that precedes "pedagogy" in each in-
stance. One speaks of composition or writing pedagogy, but 
when speaking of "literary" pedagogy (in the rare instances 
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when it is mentioned), one tends not to think of the teaching 
of literature as "reading" pedagogy, which would be the 
logical analogue. This seemingly innocuous syntax is re-
vealing in that it foregrounds the attitude that governs the 
teaching of literature. Scholes writes, 
When we say we "teach literature," instead of 
saying we teach reading, or interpretation, or 
criticism, we are saying that we expound the wisdom 
and truth of our texts, that we are in fact priests 
and priestesses in the service of a secular 
scripture: "the best that has been thought and 
said." (12) 
Despite the work of the last 15 years or so to encourage 
movement away from a singular focus on canonical texts, it 
has been my experience as both a student and teacher (and the 
experience of many of my students in previous classes) that 
many literature students emerge feeling that they had been 
subjected to a quasi-religious ritual. 
Scholes' analogy might be extended further, for even 
those literature students who resist the mystical impulses of 
Great Books are aware that they were (allegedly) in the 
presence of the sacred - though they didn't "buy it" - just 
as nonbelievers in a church recognize they were subject to 
religious belief. The material effect of this orientation is 
that thinking outside such a paradigm is nearly impossible; 
students are not encouraged to think about how litera~ure 
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could be taught differently. Either one prostrates oneself 
before the text, they are led to believe, or one rejects such 
worship entirely in favor of a radical subjectivism that 
claims all interpretations are equally valid if they are 
strongly held. Both subject positions are based on the New 
Critical tenet that meaning resides exclusively in the 
literary text itself. That is, even though extreme sub-
jectivism may seem more "liberating" than "text worship," 
there is actually little difference. 
Some students are perfectly happy to learn that the 
meaning of a poem resides within the poem; in conventional 
literary pedagogy, if they can't guess what the meaning is, 
the teacher usually provides it for them. Alternatively, some 
students feel constrained by this approach and suspect there 
are as many meanings as there are readers. But in both 
cases, "meaning" emanates from the text - not from history or 
politics or the reader. And students know that, regardless 
of what they believe, they must provide the "correct," text-
based, teacher-sanctioned meaning on exams, papers, etc.: 
"[T]raditional schooling has taught students that knowledge 
is serious only if it comes from the teacher or the 
textbook" (Shor Empowering 73). This critique shows how stu-
dent resistance to pedagogy - the possibility of constructing 
and assuming alternative subject positions - has posed little 
threat to the power of New Critical literary pedagogy. By 
assuming universal agreement on the basic hermeneutic 
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understand it. 
Poetry has been taught to me in regard that there 
is always some underlying meaning and you have 
to break it down, piece by piece. 
To keep an open mind, and read in between the 
lines. 
Some poetry has hidden or double meaning. 
I've been told to read slowly and really analize 
[sic] what the author is writing. 
I can't remember. 
Since most of these students were freshmen and sophomores, I 
thought initially that their reactions might refer more to 
high school courses than those in college. However, in sev-
eral upper-level drama and fiction courses, I received these 
reactions: 
My instructors have told me what to focus on and 
look for without allowing any other 
interpretation. 
I was taught to see literature as having some sort 
of deeper meaning. I was taught to respect 
textual writings in a "sacred" sort of way. 
I have been taught to read between the lines, to 
find a hidden meaning, and to determine what 
the author meant. 
I have been taught to get the meaning out of a 
story, etc. 
While there has been an occasional more encouraging response 
("What the author has written may not be what I think it is, 
but it [sic] doesn't mean that the teacher or other students 
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have the correct meaning")ll most students have indicated 
that their literary study has largely been an exercise in 
mind reading, as it was for me as an undergraduate. 
In a Romantic poetry course, I remember reading a Keats 
poem ("Endymion," perhaps) repeatedly one night, trying to 
figure out what the meaning was, since the course had shown 
me to be a very poor mind reader. Having finally decided 
what the meaning was, I went to class the next morning and 
discovered, much to my surprise, that I was actually "right" 
- my interpretation "coincided" with the teacher's. I can 
recall the utter joy and amazement at finally "knowing" a 
piece of literature. 
That sense of euphoria has since turned to something 
else - mostly frustration. Unfortunately, I don't think my 
experience and those of my students are atypical of what is 
happening in some (if not many) English classrooms. Recent 
pedagogical scholarship has not influenced as much of the 
discipline as one might think. This may be because conven-
tional New Critical pe<lagogy is just as "productive" today as 
it when Gis were flocking to colleges in the late 1940s - it 
processes students through courses with maximum efficiency. 
Teaching students to "just read the text" takes much less 
time than other approaches one might use, largely because it 
11 I say "more encouraging," to highlight the potential prob-
lem in this response as well. This type of reaction may be 
seen as leading to total relativism, an "anything goes" ap-
proach to the study of literature. 
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discourages self-consciousness about the reading process. 
Gregory Jay writes that New Criticism "was such a popular and 
successful mode of pedagogy [because] it disciplined the 
reading subject to an impersonal brand of aesthetic and moral 
commentary that was utterly blind to its own cultural id-
iosyncrasy" (324). There is a ruthless pedagogical economy to 
New Criticism that is just beginning to be challenged. 
But to at least as great an extent as economics, this 
pedagogical model is based, at least in part, on fear. 
Scholes writes that, since the 1960s, we literature teachers 
"have been losing our congregations, and we are scared to 
death that our temples will be converted into movie theaters 
or video parlors and we will end our days doing intellectual 
janitorial or custodial workff (13). Some lament the evolu-
tion of English into a discipline where "cultural studies" 
and "theory" exist alongside "literature." However, whether 
or not one approves, English can never be the discipline it 
once was. What needs to be addressed is how teaching prac-
tices must change to adapt to the shifts in subject matter 
and student demographics. The canonical orientation and ho-
mogenous audience of English cannot be recaptured, so strate-
gies must be devised for meeting the challenges that now con-
front teachers. Abandoning old habits can prove difficult, 
however. Recently, a colleague and I were discussing how to 
teach Thomas Pynchon's Y..... The main problem with the novel, 
he said, was trying to "boil down" the meaning of each 
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chapter to lecture about it to his students. This 
conversation confirmed my suspicion that almost any literary 
text 
etc. 
regardless how postmodern, radical, unconventional, 
could be made pedestrian {and productive of similar 
student responses) if taught in a certain (New Critical) way. 
Unfortunately, this approach is encouraged in some literary 
handbooks and anthologies - to which I will now turn - which 
materially affects the interpretive process and forestalls 
the construction of (self)critical subject positions. 
A critique of the effects of New Criticism on pedagogy, 
especially as manifested in handbooks and anthologies, must 
begin with Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren's 1938 work, 
Understanding Poetry. It is useful to look at a crucial pas-
sage toward the end of the introduction. The authors write: 
[W]e must emphasize [a] matter of the greatest 
importance. [C]riticism and analysis. is 
ultimately of value only insofar as it can return 
r~aQers to the poem. itself - return them, that is, 
better prepared to experience it more immediately, 
fully, and, shall we say, innocently. The poem is 
an experience, yes, but it is a deeply significant 
experience, and criticism aims only at making the 
reader more aware of the depth and range of the 
experience. (16) 
The highlighted statement provides clear evidence that Brooks 
and Warren sought to head off any inclinations toward 
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historicist interpretations that students or teachers might 
have had. That Brooks and Warren felt the need to issue such 
rejoinders may reveal the kind of reader they wished to con-
struct for their anthology.12 After providing their audience 
with much information about the technicalities of reading po-
etry, Brooks and Warren explicitly state what kind of reader 
they are interested in: 
Given intelligence and sensitivity in some degree, 
much of our learning is accomplished unconsciously. 
But to speak specifically of poetry, mere immersion 
does little good unless the reader is making, 
however unconsciously, some discriminations, 
comparisons, and judgments; if he merely wallows in 
a vague, pleasurable reaction, the immersion can 
mean little or nothing. (16) 
The New Critical subject position suggested here necessitates 
a subject who is "intelligent" and "sensitive" enough to have 
an unconscious ability to learn. Less fortunate persons evi-
dently learn only consciously - if at all. This subject must 
12 In fact, all of the following analyses of English hand-
books and anthologies will be informed by this general idea 
that what their authors request their audience not to do 
foregrounds certain anxieties about interpretation they wish 
to suppress in themselves and others. John Clifford writes 
that such a critique that "focuses on the outside, on what is 
excluded, reveals as much as an examination of actual con-
tent. [A] bsence is as revealing as presence." See "The 
Subject in Discourse," pp. 38-51, in Patricia Harkin and John 
Schilb, eds., Contending With Words: Composition and Rhetoric 
in a Postmodern Age (MLA, 1991). 
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undergo a specific kind of "immersion" in poetry, an inter-
pretive baptism that brings to bear his "intelligence" and 
"sensitivity" upon the poem to produce qualitative "discrimi-
nations" that are "immediate, " "full" and "innocent" reading 
experiences. "Vague, pleasurable reaction[s]" 
sensual responses - are to be avoided. 
secular, 
Given the religious/secular, sacred/profane binary 
rhetoric of these passages, one need not have read Barthes or 
Lacan to see that Brooks and Warren advocate a puritanical 
interpretive subjectivity based on denial. They seek to oc-
clude the "pleasure of the text," "jouissance" or any other 
corporeally pleasurable reaction to literary texts, which ex-
plicitly foregrounds why their recommended subject position 
discourages (self) critical thinking - it denies the self. In 
its attempt to privilege alleged interpretive virtues such as 
"objectivity" and "discernment," the Brooks/Warren New Crit-
icism reveals a fear of their opposites - subjectivity, play, 
pleasure. 
This anxiety is also specifically masculine. Their 
rhetoric sets stereotypically male characteristics such as 
discrimination and judgment in opposition to a feared "femi-
nine" quality - pleasure - arguing that a feminized criticism 
would be ruinous. But this anxiety is cloaked by a layer of 
"scientific," "rational," "objective" language that seeks to 
construct a subject who would see the New Critical position 
as "natural" and "commonsensical." 
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In this regard, many current literature handbooks and 
anthologies pick up where Brooks and Warren left off. Their 
authors also try to present their ideological positions as 
widely agreed-upon truths about reading. I will now analyze 
several currently popular literature handbooks and textbooks, 
the problems in which are not, I suspect, isolated occur-
rences. This critique should not be taken as a wholesale 
indictment of the genre; I merely wish to show how their 
ostensibly helpful intentions toward literature students are 
often undermined by their rhetoric. 
Richard L. McGuire's Passionate Attention: An Introduc-
tion to Literary Study was first published in 1973 by W.W. 
Norton and was reissued in 1990. According to Norton, it is 
one of their best-selling literature handbooks. It is evi-
dently quite popular in its present form, since the 1990 edi-
tion is a reprint, not a revision. McGuire values the role 
of criticism in literary studies by defining it as the paying 
of "passionate attentionN to lit~rature, but the description 
of his book on the back cover reveals a problematic approach. 
It states that "the author's intent is to provide relation-
ships between the interests of student and teacher, and to 
set them in a simple, coherent overall context" (emphasis 
added) . While McGuire may be able to speak for his interests 
as a teacher, and perhaps also for those of his students at 
MacMurray College in Jacksonville, Illinois, a small liberal 
arts college with a homogenous (white, middle-class) qtudent 
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population, a question remains: in how "simple" or "coherent" 
a context are students' and teachers' interests enmeshed at 
MacMurray or, even more importantly, a more heterogenous in-
stitution? Moreover, don't these •relationships" he mentions 
already exist? The interests and desires of students and 
teachers are certainly not always discussed or even conscious 
to the individuals involved, but they are always already pre-
sent. 
Rhetorical considerations concerning the student reader 
whom the text constructs must be examined also. Consider an-
other statement from the back cover that precedes the one 
just cited above: "Students may read the book on their own in 
a single evening, for the author's intent. One is led 
to believe that the relationships between students' and 
teachers' interests are not only simple and coherent, but 
they can also be learned in one sitting. Moreover, the 
third-person, formal diction ("Students may read") reinforces 
conventional notions of the subject positions of students and 
teachers and the idea of the critic-as-authority, allied with 
teachers. 
Andrew Debicki has noted that this alliance between the 
critic and the teacher usually is not explicitly stated in 
print (handbooks, anthologies and the like) or in a conscious 
way in the classroom, but is manifested in the attitude that 
prevails in a classroom. He writes that a class 
immersed in New Criticism. 
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. will be more likely 
to expect an authoritative solution to all of its 
problems on the part of the teacher; if none is 
forthcoming, it will probably attempt to invent an 
authoritative solution itself and then smugly move 
on to the next problem and poem. (181) 
Central to the discovery of such "authoritative solutions" 
for New Critics is a primary focus on the "text itself." 
McGuire renames this "the work in itself" or the "objective 
approach" (14). In critiquing Passionate Attention, I wish 
to suggest that the pedagogical upshot of the author's "ob-
jective approach" is an objectification of students, not 
texts (if that were even possible), which functions as what 
Foucault calls a "dividing practice" wherein the subject is 
either "divided inside himself or divided from others" 
("Subject" 208). In the case of the subjectivity engendered 
by a handbook like McGuire's, both divisions are encouraged. 
That is to say, through its fixation on the authorita-
tive interpretation of the literary text itself, student sub-
jects are divided inside themselves by the promotion of a di-
chotomous mindset: the subject who reads "critically" and 
"correctly" for academic purposes versus the subject who 
"just reads" for pleasure. This fissure is then reproduced 
outside the subject; she is divided from some of her fellow 
students in English and other disciplines who feel that the 
literary pedagogical proj@ct coerces one to "read too_much 
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into" texts to "succeed" in literature courses. To be a 
literature student (and especially an English major) is to 
lead a somewhat schizophrenic academic existence, subject to 
a constant internal and external struggle about what consti-
tutes legitimate interpietation. This is not to advocate a 
single-minded mode of interpretation that would govern every 
text one encounters. Yet it is important to realize that 
literature students are being sent mixed (if not contradic-
tory) signals about how they should read inside versus out-
side the academy and that these signals function to reinforce 
problematic oppositions such as academy/"real world" and aca-
demic literary study/"just reading." 
Encouraging students to give the same sort of attention 
to Milton that they give to a Harlequin romance novel is not 
a viable solution. Still, McGuire reinforces the stereotype 
of "academic" reading, guiding the literary student toward a 
New Critical interpretive approach while proposing it as an 
"objective" view that interprets the work "as fairly as pos-
sible" (65): "The work should stand at the center of the 
reader's study" (24); "[O]ther studies are important to the 
work only if the work is the central object" (26). Good 
readers must also approach the literary work with "an accep-
tance of the work as it is," and they must "take up a new 
work with as much innocence as [they] can muster," "in-
quir[ing] into the nature of the truth of the work" (66). 
McGuire's advice about how to read responsibly is trou-
blesome. 
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The first problem, as exemplified in the just-cited 
quotations, is his constant reinforcement of the bifurcation 
of "the work" from what lies "outside" the work. The intrin-
sic/extrinsic opposition is the founding gesture of New Crit-
icism; but although one may justifiably critique its theoret-
ical untenability, perhaps a greater concern is the pedagogi-
cal consequences. For the typical student fear of "reading 
too much into the text" is squarely based on this dichotomy. 
The literary work, they have been told, contains its mean-
ings, and while extrinsic information may help shed some 
light upon the work, the truth of the text is intrinsic and 
must be "excavated." 
To encourage a New Critical view of the literary work in 
one's pedagogy is to limit the interpretive possibilities of 
students and to reinforce the stereotype of academic reading 
and thinking as an impersonal if not fruitless pursuit. 
McGuire's statement that legitimate criticism "does not re-
quire that the critic's own response to a work become a part 
of the discussion," but calls for "a detached point of view 
on the part of the crj.tic" highlights the limitations of 
conventional, New Critical literary pedagogy (44). This lim-
ited and limiting view of the relationship between text and 
reader produces subjectq who view the interpretive process as 
an archeological dig in which, if one moves enough dirt, 
shards of meaning will emerge. 
As I will argue in greater detail in Chapter 4, (self) 
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critical pedagogy entails a redefinition of the text/reader 
relationship along the lines of Derrida's notion of "general 
text," a deconstruction of the traditional, intrinsic/ 
extrinsic model of text/reader relations. Derrida's work 
reminds us that interpretation does not (and should not) end 
with the supposed "empirical closure of the unity of a 
corpus" (Gasche 280). A (self)critical interpretive mode en-
tails analysis of general text, predicated on the insepara-
bility of the literary "work itself," the "cultural text" 
(Scholes' useful phrase) and the text that is the inter-
preter's world view or mode of interpretation (33). It is 
ironic that McGuire, at one point toward the end of Passion-
ate Attention, seems to encourage a (self) critical way of 
reading when he warns that "there are teachers who do not de-
sire to give their students a choice of possibilities" (67). 
He leaves himself open to critique as one of those teachers. 
This is not to say that McGuire intentionally or con-
sciously puts forth a limiting model of literary interpreta-
tion. But because his model is based on the idea that the 
meaning of a literary text resides in the "text itself," the 
rhetorical effects are inevitable. On the other hand, an-
other widely used handbook, Random House's Reading. Writing. 
and the Study of Literature, edited by Arthur W. Biddle and 
Toby Fulwiler, attempts to provide a less New Criticism-in-
fluenced model for reading and writing about literature and, 
in large part, it succeeds. What is pertinent to the_present 
argument, though, is how New Critical ideas still manage to 
infiltrate the text's ostensibly egalitarian discourse. 
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The overall rhetoric of this text is much less prescrip-
tive than McGuire'$, and there is a far greater emphasis on 
the interrelations among thinking, reading and writing; that 
Fulwiler is a composition scholar may account for both advan-
tages. A seemingly minor rhetorical detail Biddle and Ful-
wiler' s use of "we" compared with McGuire's reference to 
"students" in advocating critical approaches - might make a 
difference in how students perceive the relationship between 
themselves and the "experts." That is, Biddle and Fulwiler 
don't present themselves as holders of literary truth; 
rather, they fashion themselves as more experienced readers 
who wish to help students become more experienced as well. 
However, their progressive pedagogy is occasionally un-
dercut by conventional, New Critical admonitions. Consider 
the following passage from Biddle's and Allen Shepherd's 
chapter, "Responding to Fiction," in which they discuss the 
relation of a symbol to the fictional text: 
To assume then, as some people do, that the symbol 
is hiding there somewhere and can be hunted down 
is a serious interpretive misconception. 
Only after you feel you fully understand the 
literal level of the story's meaning and yet sense 
a pattern of suggestive details, a dimension 
beyond the literal, will you wish to explore 
symbolic interpretation. Careful reading and 
common sense are the most important requirements. 
( 3 6) 
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Here the tension between unconventional and conventional ped-
agogy arises. To point out the fallaciousness of the tradi-
tional surface/depth textual metaphor - of attempting to ex-
cavate symbols from a text is commendable. Yet to then ad-
vise that comprehension of "literal meaning" must precede 
"symbolic interpretation" is perplexing, in that such advice 
is underpinned by the same metaphor. As "careful reading" 
and "common sense" dictates, they say, one should first 
"fully understand" the literal, surface meaning to subse-
quently plumb the rich depths of symbolic meaning. The no-
tion of "full" understanding poses difficulty as well. How 
does one decide when one has achieved it? And doesn't this 
notion violate a tenet of traditional literary study, namely 
that great literature is rich and complex to the point of in-
terpretive inexhaustibility? Finally, as is the case in 
McGuire's text, meaning is once again assumed to be centered 
in the "text itself," not in the reader, or in the interpre-
tive transaction between reader and text, or anywhere else. 
This conventional line of interpretation is continued in 
Sidney Poger's chapter, "Responding to Poetry." In many 
ways, poetry is the most difficult genre with which to grap-
ple pedagogically; as Poger notes: "We don't read writing 
like this very often, we don't talk this way, and many stu-
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dents contend that nobody likes poetry anyway" (46). Thus, 
writing for an audience about reading poetry cannot be easy. 
Still, in this chapter, an organic, New Critical view of the 
poetic text is apparent at times. One key to understanding 
poetry, says Poger, is to imagine the poet's writing process. 
The question a poet asks herself - to which the poem is the 
answer - is: "How can I communicate what I feel in words?" 
( 45) . This question is ambiguous in a way that highlights 
the problem of its theoretical assumption. One might say 
that the question Poger is trying to ask is "How can I commu-
nicate in words what I feel nonlinguistically?" This poses a 
theoretical difficulty from a poststructuralist standpoint: 
how is one conscious of "feeling" a particular way without 
recourse to language? Another concern is raised by the 
question as originally stated: "How can I communicate (in 
words) what I feel in words?" But this too raises 
difficulties that are subsequently reinforced in Poger's 
text; he writes that since "poetry is made up of words, and 
words communicate something, we should be able to discover 
how the poem works" (46). His emphasis on the communicative 
function of poetic language restricts interpretation. 
Regardless of whether a poet intends her poem to communicate 
something, it can be read in a noncommunicative fashion. The 
converse is also true; a poet may intend to write an utterly 
unconventional, linguistically noncornrnunicative poem, but it 
can always be interpreted as having a clear message even if 
that message is that there is no message. Poger, however, 
doesn't entertain the possibility that the locus of meaning 
may lie "outside" the "text itself." 
Another que$tion he deems important to literary 
study - "[H]ow does the poem mean what I think it means?" 
points students toward the conventional, New Critical idea 
that meanings lie only within poems. One might notice the 
rhetoric of the question; the poem means, while the reader 
thinks it means. The question does not focus in a (self) 
critical way on the role of the reader, as a question like 
"How do I think about the poem?" would. For Poger, words in 
a poem contain the meaning, or the poet's answer to some 
question, and it is the responsibility of the reader to see 
the meaning/answer and to imagine what the question was. 
Even while he states that "good literature is not exhausted 
through any single interpretation," he limits the kind of 
interpretation to be judged as legitimate (48). 
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James Howe's chapter, "Responding to Drama," is simi-
larly as New Critical, but he uses different means than 
Poger. Howe works from a performance-based, reader-response 
approach, but his putative interpretive openness is often un-
dermined by particular statements that imply that readers, as 
makers of meaning, function in much the same way texts seem-
ingly do in New Criticism. Good readers are as internally 
consistent for Howe as texts are for New Critics. He says 
that "once a performance (or a reading) begins, the point of 
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view cannot be changed" (60, emphasis added). Notwithstand-
ing the possibility that viewers of drama might be so enrap-
tured by the spectacle of a well-acted play that their points 
of view, their interpretative stances, might remain rela-
tively static, Howe's point is misguided. He implies that 
dramatic texts require responsible readers to engage in the 
interpretive equivalent of tunnel vision and that, if one's 
interpretive mind wanders, the interpretation produced is il-
legitimate. He reemphasizes this point later, when he writes 
that readers of drama "complete the script [and] give it a 
self-consistent interpretationn (69). Just as for a New 
Critic, everything in a poem must fit into the interpreta-
tion; readers must make their own readings "self-consistent." 
In both cases, nothing may be left out; everything must make 
sense; seeming contradictions must be manipulated into uni-
ties. Those who cannot read in this manner aren't reading 
"closely" or "critically" enough. 
Unfortunately, a corrective for this conventional view 
of students and their interpretative methods doesn't appear 
until the chapter on "Literary Criticism and Theory," written 
by James Holstun. He writes, "[W]hen literary critics claim 
to be studying 'the text itself,' they are in fact studying 
it from a particular theoretical point of view they may not 
want (or be able) to articulate" (73). It is noteworthy that 
this important statement occurs in the fifth chapter, after 
students probably have read the previous pieces on reading 
the traditional literary genres. "Theory," in this 
construction, becomes simply another subject area to be 
covered after the important information about literature has 
been imparted. Still, Holstun clearly and usefully discusses 
the major critical/theoretical schools in a responsible way. 
He even says "the chapters in this book on poetry, drama, and 
fiction are New Critical" (76). However, Holstun also argues, 
in defense of New Criticism, "that there is a democratic and 
populist current at work in the New Criticism, since it 
claims to show students how to master certain techniques of 
close reading. . and become their own authorities" (76). 
Two issues need to raised here. First, the New Criti-
cism was arguably never intended to be "democratic" or "pop-
ulist," nor are its pedagogical consequences. Hugh Kenner, a 
New Critic himself, noted that the New Criticism "rescu[ed] 
poetics in the New World from naivete" (46). New Criticism 
was conceived as an escape from various forms of critical 
subjectivity (historicist, psychoanalytic, biographical, 
etc.) into the "text itself." And the methodology that en-
abled one to get at that text - "close reading" - did not al-
low one to become·an "authority." Rather, students became 
increasingly dependent on teachers to verify the "meaning" 
they "found" in the text. Holstun argues that New Criticism 
adds a democratic and populist element to the preceding chap-
ters, but it seems to me the opposite is true; the residual 
New Criticism in the previous chapters is precisely the prob-
lem. The "populist" element in New Critical pedagogy is what 
Adorno and others have called "authoritarian populism," in 
which a promise of order, of determinate structure, seduces 
the public. New Criticism reassures readers in this way; it 
wards off interpretive cbaos, promising locatable meaning in 
the "text itself" through "close reading." 
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"Close reading" to find the "meaning" in the "text it-
self" is neither the only nor the best advice to give litera-
ture students. 
the solution: 
It is, Cain argues, the problem rather than 
It is unquestionably basic to the discipline, but 
is not the discipline itself. "Literature" 
forms one group or body of texts that we study 
cultural studies as interfering with the real 
business of criticism, we should see them as 
further evidence of how capricious and wide-
ranging criticism can be. (118) 
As I will argue in Chapter 4, literature students should be 
exposed to the s~me modes of interpretation that theorists 
use in their scholarship and t~ching. There is a need to re-
sist the way in which New Criticism functions in classroom 
discourse as a kind of default mechanism; when students don't 
respond to pedagogical efforts, teachers often resort to tex-
tual explication or "close reading" almost unconsciously. 
Holbrun notes that tbis phenomenon occurs "even when [a] pro-
fessor is a Marxist, feminist, or deconstructionist who has 
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serious disagreements with the New Criticism as a theoretical 
approach" (77). This is not to say, as Cain makes clear, 
that close reading is inherently harmful. Rather, it is 
problematic when it.=> pi-actice Q.oro.inates pedagogy. Resorting 
to teaching close readtnq supports the pedagogical economy of 
New Criticism. When a discussion-based approach is not 
"working," one may resort to a New Critical teaching mode to 
ensure that students are "acquiring knowledge" or "getting 
their money's worth." 
Text Book: An Introduction to Literary Language, edited 
by Scholes, Nancy Comley and Gregory Ulmer, seems to resist 
the theory that close reading naturally leads to empowered 
student readers. The editors refrain from fetishizing such 
an approach; they emphasize "learn[ing] more about how 
narrative and dramatic texts work" (1, emphasis added). This 
focus on how human events are "textualized," how texts 
function in society, allows us as readers "to be a little 
more conscious of our own situations," or, increasingly 
(self)critical. The titles of three sections reveal their 
goal of expanding studencs• ideas about what can be "read": 
"Texts and P~le"'; "Texts, Thoughts, and Things"; "Texts and 
Other Texts." 
But this joint venture of a structuralist (Scholes), a 
compositionist (Comley) and a ludic postmodernist (Ulmer) of-
ten relies on familiar New Critical pedagogical techniques. 
Text Book is surprising:J;y schematic for a text that p:i;;-omises 
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"an alternative approach to the traditional course called 
'Writing About Literature' or 'Introduction to Literature'" 
(v) . It is scrupulously thematized and subthematized: the 
section "Texts an~ People• contains two subsections, "Story 
and Story Teller" and "Character and Confrontation." "Texts, 
Thoughts, and Things" comprises nine parts, including 
"Metaphor in Three Poems," "Metaphor and Dream" and "Poetic 
Uses of Metaphor." While I am not saying that this kind of 
classification can be avoided totally, one may see some 
similarities between Text Book and Brooks' and Warren's 
works. 
More problematic is the meticulous introductions Scholes 
et al. provide for each reading selection. These seemingly 
innocuous guides for the reader profoundly shape her reading 
experience, foreclosing other interpretive possibilities. 
Consider, for example, the editors' introduction to a Mary 
Louise Pratt essay: 
For our purposes, the most important thing to learn 
from Pratt is the six-part structure of the ordi-
nary personal narrative. You will find versions of 
thi~ structure - or interesting derivations from it 
- in every kind of text that presents a story. (2) 
Perhaps the editors might be credited for quite baldly stat-
ing what they're trying to accomplish, but why not just tell 
students about six-part structure if that's the only lesson 
they want students to learn from Pratt's essay? The second 
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sentence in the quoted passage is even more pernicious; they 
tell students that "every kind of text that presents a story" 
has a six-part structure. If a reader cannot find all six 
parts, is the text not ·a narrative? Or is the reader incom-
petent? What should readers do with certain feminist and 
postmodern texts that seem to be narratives but may not con-
form to the paradigm? The editors' introductions not only 
preclude alternative readings of the texts they accompany, 
but they also purvey a New Critical view of texts in general 
- in this example, a search for structure that is not unlike 
the hunt for "hidden" meanings. 
Another weakness of Text Book is its overly brief, de-
contextualized reading selections. As noted above regarding 
Pratt, the readings seem to have been chosen only for their 
didactic usefulness. The editors generally want students to 
get one lesson from each reading; the length of the readings 
along with the introductions almost guarantee that. For 
example, they excerpt a page of dialogue from Kate Chopin's 
story "The Kiss" and then tell students: "Your task is to add 
everything that is needed to make this into a play that is as 
complete as the . .storv from which it has been taken" (27, em-
phasis added). Again, there are two problems. First, they 
make only one very direct writing assignment that seems both 
daunting and unrealistic: "add everything that is needed." 
This "task" will produce a play that is "as complete" as 
Chopin's story. The editors imply that literature possesses 
a New Critical wholeness, which students are charged with 
restoring. 
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The assignment also prods students toward "modeling" 
literary works, a pedagogical technique that Ulmer especially 
favors.13 Addressing students, the editors write, "One of 
the goals of [a] course [using Text Book] is to teach you to 
use models" (x). They subsequently list questions students 
should keep in mind while using their text, such as "What is 
the model I am to follow?. . What is the purpose of the 
supporting readings? How do they contribute to my under-
standing of the model?" (x). The last section of Text Book 
explicitly concerns modeling, notably Derrida's Glas and a 
text that models Derrida. The aim of modeling, according to 
the editors, "is to help students feel at home in the uni-
verse of textuality" (v) . Modeling can be useful in that it 
allows students to be creative, to write outside the stric-
tures of the five-paragraph theme or argumentative essay. 
But modeling also can be problematic, as least as it is 
articulated in Text Book and in some of Ulmer's other work. 
Given the fact that Ulmer's preferred models are Derrida, the 
German performance artist Joseph Beuys and other white males, 
modeling can be criticized for its homogeneity. This is not 
to say that women or persons of color won't learn anything 
from mimicking Derrida's writing style, but I would argue 
that such writing assignments may shape those writers' 
13 See Ulmer's Applied Grarnrnatoloav (Johns Hopkins, 1985). 
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responses in a way that represses conflict and marginality in 
their texts. The notion of "feel[ing] at home in the 
universe of textuality" is also troublesome. Writers on the 
margins often feel English teachers fail to take seriously 
their uses of language, forcing them to adapt to the language 
of white male power, Standard American English. While 
neither Derrida nor Beuys discourse in that way, women and 
minority student writers still may see Ulmer's modeling as a 
similar dictate. Though they would not discourage such an 
idea, one still wonders why Scholes, Comley and Ulmer don't 
propose Ishmael Reed or Maya Angelou as models. The 
"universe of textuality" into which the editors invite 
students seems, in the final analysis, unfortunately similar 
to Rorty's "community" or "conversation of mankind," albeit 
with a structuralist or poststructuralist veneer. It is a 
universe where white men's discourse is presented as 
"example," a quite traditional universe after all. 
The problems I see in Text Book suggest that using text-
books and handbooks in (self)critical literary pedagogy may 
be ill-advised. New Criticism so pervades even the most 
seemingly progressive or avant garde textbooks that the only 
way to leave open the possibility of (self)critical thinking 
may be to avoid them entirely.14 Of course, editions of pri-
mary literary texts have apparatuses of their own that are 
14 See Chapter. 4, p. 126 ff., for a discussion of classroom 
alternatives to using textbooks and handbooks. 
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also often based on New Criticism - which reinforces how 
closely the productive capacity of New Criticism is related 
to such disciplinary matters as book editing and production. 
Texts with New Critical apparatuses sell because they make 
teaching easier, a~d this cycle is not easily broken - in 
literature or composition. 
The influence of New Criticism on the teaching of writ-
ing has not been widely discussed. This is perhaps yet an-
other consequence of the disciplinary cleavage between liter-
ature and composition. There is hardly a mention of composi-
tion in Graff's Professing Literature or Cain's The Crisis in 
Criticism. However, New Criticism's role in shaping composi-
tion pedagogy is a fertile topic for examination, though a 
complete treatment is beyond the scope of the present study. 
In what follows, I will first describe the New Critical as-
sumptions that underpin popular approaches to the teaching of 
writing. Second, I will show how these assumptions have been 
manifested in several current composition textbooks and an-
thologies, and what kind of student subject positions they 
construct. 
Sharon Crowley, whose work often explores connections 
amongst various kinds of critical theory, was perhaps the 
first scholar to hint at the New Criticism/composition rela-
tionship. It is surprising that this connection was not ex-
plored earlier than 1989, in her NCTE monograph A Teacher's 
Introduction to Deconstruction, since its genesis seems 
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by James Berlin: 1) the rhetor "is to be as 'objective' as 
possible, necessitating the abandonment of social, 
psychological, and historical preconceptions that might 
interfere with [a] response" to the object of study; he is to 
give "an innocent reaction" (as Brooks and Warren advocate); 
2) truth "exists prior to language," while "[l]anguage is 
regarded at worst as a distorting medium that alters the 
original perception, and at best as a transparent device that 
captures the original experience so that it might be 
reproduced in the faculties of one's audience"; and 3) the 
audience is "outside of the meaning-making act [and] assumed 
to be as objective as the writer, so that the language 
presented can stimulate in the reader the experience the 
writer originally had" (Rhetoric 8). Current-traditional 
rhetoric regards "all truths. . as certain, readily 
available to the correct method of investigation" and, 
therefore, writing instruction should advocate "patterns of 
arrangement and superficial correctness [as its] main ends" 
(9). In comparing New Criticism to current-traditional 
rhetoric, one sees that although the former is concerned with 
the consumption or interpretation of texts and the latter 
more with textual production, both approaches seek to 
construct objectivist, scientistic subjects for whom textual 
production and consumption are straightforward processes. 
Moreover, both paradigms have become disciplinary common 
sense. Berlin echoes Cain's comment about the normalization 
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of the New Criticism when he writes that current-traditional 
rhetoric has made it impossible "for the majority of English 
teachers. . to conceive of the discipline in any other way" 
(9). An analogy m~y be drawn from Foucault's comment about 
Western education since the 18th century: "The Normal is 
established as a principle of coercion in teaching with the 
introduction of a standardized education and the establish-
ment of the ecoles normales (teachers' training colleges) 
II ("Means" 196). 
Composition textbooks and handbooks have contributed 
significantly to this situation. Robert Connors writes that 
"textbooks, which change with glacial slowness, provide sta-
bility amid the shifting winds· of theoretical argument. They 
serve as sources for the proven truths needed for students' 
basic training. II ( 190) . In what follows, I will show 
that the spirit of New Criticism15 still informs composition 
textbooks and anthologies in the two functions that these 
texts are supposed to perform as "the chief representatives 
of the lore and wisdom of the past" - "advice" about "how to 
write" and "professioni;.\l" essays presented as "models" or 
stimuli for student writing (Dewey Experience 18). 
The sheer number of composition texts and the scope of 
15 In the remainder of this chapter, I will refer to the the-
oretical assumptions that underpin the composition texts un-
der discussion as derived from "New Criticism, " rather than 
make repeated references to "New Criticism/current-tradi-
tional rhetoric," having already argued that the two 
paradigms are similar philosophically. 
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this study precludes exhaustive critique, but I can best sup-
port my general argument about New Criticism's influence on 
composition pedagogy can be made through critiques of two 
current, extremely popular texts. Rise Axelrod and Charles 
Cooper's The St. Martin's Guide to Writing was first pub-
lished in 1985, with a second edition in 1988 and a third in 
1991. It has been, according to John Clifford, "perhaps the 
most well received of the new process rhetorics" (43). Sub-
stantially little about the text, however, has changed, which 
may indicate that its adopters in English departments across 
the country have been pleased with its structure and pedagog-
ical effectiveness. It is, writes Robert Connors, an example 
of 
[t]extbooks [that] are beginning to appear that 
concentrate on having students learn the processes 
of writing rather than abstract concepts about 
writing, that liberate the teacher to listen to her 
students rather than enslaving them to an author's 
theories. (192) 
How "liberatory" the Guide is will be considered in the fol-
lowing remarks. 
One might first focus on the epigrams inside the front 
cover and on the first page. Initially, they seem to be 
pithy bits of advice about the writing process from profes-
sional writers, some familiar to students, some perhaps not; 
the first four quotations are from Annie Dillard, Vladimir 
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Nabokov, William Faulkner and Hannah Arendt. But the epi-
grams also function as what Crowley and Stephen North call 
"practitioner lore" (Crowley Teacher's 27). They define lore 
as advice about writing that is constantly reproduced and 
"impervious to fully rationalized critique" (28). More im-
portantly, Crowley argues, "nothing that has gained admission 
is ever dropped from lore, even though some of its tenets 
might. . become contradictory. " ( 2 8) • For teachers, 
reliance on practitioner lore is, in Crowley's estimation, 
"hazardous," because of the potential for one's pedagogy to 
be undermined by contradictions. The upshot for students is 
that the presentation of lore about the composing process -
from writers students know (or are told) are "important" -
occludes (self)critical subject construction. If students 
are exposed constantly to contradictory descriptions about 
writing, without learning about the theories behind them, the 
writing process may remain mystified to all but a few of 
them. 
Arendt's epigram states, "For excellence, the presence 
of others is always required." On the facing page, one may 
subsequently read Hemingway's: "You can write any time people 
will leave you alone and not interrupt you." The student 
reader is confronted with a social constructionist view of 
writing from Arendt and a romantic paradigm from Hemingway, 
which are completely antithetical. "Well, which am I sup-
posed to do to write well?" one might imagine a student 
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thinking; the nature of writing and how one becomes a better 
writer remain mystified. 
Another example is James Van Allen's words ("I am never 
as clear about any matter as when I have just finished writ-
ing about it") compared with John Updike's ("Writing and 
rewriting are a constant search for what it is one is say-
ing"). The problem here. once again, is not that opposing 
views about writing are being presented; rather it is that 
they are not adequately contextualized and theorized. These 
epigrams metaphorize the explicit "advice" that composition 
textbooks usually provide, in their seeming author-ity and 
"common sense" that functions to suppress (self)critical 
thinking. 
The epigrams also serve as a preview for the structure 
of the rest of The St. Martin's Guide. The text character-
izes writing as taking place within firmly set genres - the 
traditional modes of narration, description, definition, 
classification, comparison and argumentation. Each genre is 
presented in a separate chapter, so they seem to be entirely 
different kinds of writing. More problematically, because of 
this structural separation, students become writing subjects 
who discover, in other ciasses, that only writing teachers 
(of New Critical inspiration) assign papers that utilize just 
one rhetorical mode. Paper assignments in the rest of the 
university generally require the use of many different modes. 
Writing assignments based on this paradigm become artificial 
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exercises in New Critical textual production, with "clear 
intentions" and readily ascertainable meanings. As Clifford 
notes, the Guide 
creates the illusion that we can transcend 
ideology with three well-developed paragraphs of 
evidence, that we can somehow change the minds of 
others in a rhetorical vacuum freed from the 
pollutants of prior social alignments. This 
thinking is more than naive; it denies identity, 
represses class conflict, negates the way ideas 
originate in specific social configurations. (44) 
This approach also suppresses the possibility of (self) 
critical subject positions, putting students at a potential 
disadvantage when they attempt to write for non-English 
courses. 
Another facet of Axelrod and Cooper's work that requires 
discussion is the "professional" essays that appear through-
out as examples of the various genres of writing. A selec-
tion from Maya Angelou exemplifies narration; an essay by 
Barbara Ehrenreich serves as an example of argumentation. 
That such writers as Angelou and Ehrenreich are present in 
the third edition is an improvement over the two previous 
versions, which featured overanthologized composition models 
by E.B. White and George Orwell. However, a problem remains 
in the third edition; each selection is only three to four 
pages long, a fragment of the original work. This brevity 
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suggests that well-written narratives always tell their 
stories quickly and that good arguments always proclaim their 
significance unequivocably. This is not to downplay the val-
ues of conciseness, logic and readability. But students do 
miss the valuable experiences of a writer working out her 
thoughts on the page and seeing writing more as often-
painstaking production than easily digestible consumption. 
Overly brief and easily consumed essays are not a prob-
lem in David Bartholomae and Anthony Petrosky's third edition 
of Ways of Reading, an anthology that has always featured 
challenging if not difficult readings. The third edition 
includes selections from Foucault's Discipline and Punish and 
Susan Willis• A Primer for Daily Life, as well as essays from 
Mary Louise Pratt and Patricia J. Williams that originally 
appeared in academic journals. Remaining from previous edi-
tions are essays and stories from Stanley Fish, Jane Tompkins 
and Alice Walker. The text thus avoids the problem of Axel-
rod and Cooper - promulgating an overly simplistic view of 
the writing process. 
Ways of Reading is challenging from both teaching and 
learning standpoints (as I discovered while using the second 
edition several years ago), and the editors' philosophy about 
the writing process is akin to that of the present study. Ad-
dressing students in their introduction, they write that 
Writing. . gives you a way of going back to work 
on the text of your own reading. It allows· you to 
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be self-critical. [I]t gives you an 
opportunity to. . qualify or extend or question 
your interpretation. 
Petrosky 3rd ed. 4) 
(Bartholomae and 
But while the spirit of their project is laudatory, some 
structural aspects of the book can be critiqued, for some 
remnants of New Critical pedagogy can be discerned. 
This is due to their emphasis on "assignment sequences," 
paper topics that ask students to compare and contrast vari-
ous essays. (The instructor's edition declares Bartholomae 
and Petrosky to be the "uniquely qualified. names most 
prominently associated with sequenced writing.") However, a 
problem with combining sequenced writing with extremely chal-
lenging essays is that a class spends inordinate time reading 
and writing about two or three essays, often to the point of 
student disinterest. Moreover, students are subtly prodded 
toward certain interpretations through the language of the 
paper assignments. An example is the assignment in which 
students are asked to compare Walker Percy's and John Berg-
er's positions regarding "possible 'approaches' to a painting 
in a museum": 
Two of your approaches should reflect Percy's best. 
advice to a viewer who wanted to develop a 
successful strategy; two should represent the 
best you feel Berger would have to offer. When 
you've finished explaining these four approaches, 
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go on in your essay to examine the differences 
between those you associate with Percy and those 
you associate with Berger. What are the key 
differences? And what do they say about the 
different ways these two thinkers approach the 
problem of why we do or do not see that which lies 
before us? (93) 
There is a logistical problem in that Percy's essay occurs 
much later in the book, but the language of the assignment is 
a larger concern. In asking for "four approaches," 
Bartholomae and Petrosky risk returning to the "five-para-
graph theme" paradigm in which students cease to think, read 
or write after four approaches have been located or five 
paragraphs have been written. And in asking what the differ-
ences between Percy and Berger are, the similarities are sum-
marily excluded. Student readers are told that Percy and 
Berger approach issues in different ways, not similar ones, 
and may assume that any similarities they can discern are il-
legitimate. This is not to say that the differences are 
unimportant to bring up. Rather, one must anticipate the 
consequences of highlighting and legitimizing textual differ-
ences instead of the similarities. 
In the assignment sequences, essays are also grouped to-
gether thematically for use in longer writing projects. A 
possible problem here is that the theme of each sequence will 
function to limit the possibilities for interpreting the 
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essays. For example, Berger's "Ways of Seeing" essay is 
grouped under two assignment sequences, "Ways of Composing" 
and "Ways of Seeing." One can foresee students who are 
working on the former project picking out only what they need 
from Berger's essay to fit with the other essays in that 
group (by Paulo Freire and Adrienne Rich). That is, students 
might radically decontextualize Berger's essay to "make it 
fit" into the thematic paradigm that Bartholomae and Petrosky 
constructed, a move many students make when confronted with a 
constrictive writing assignment. The editors are not return-
ing students to Brooks-and-Warren-like positions, but this 
critique reveals how New Critical tendencies can surface even 
in demonstrably progressive pedagogical projects. 
The pedagogical legacy of New Criticism may be even 
stronger than previous scholars have thought. And this is 
despite the fact that the authors of the above-mentioned 
handbooks, textbooks and anthologies would seem to be among 
the most active, theoretically aware members of the disci-
pline. One must also consider the "silent majority" who do 
not publish widely and may not be acquainted with contempo-
rary theories - and how many students their teaching affects. 
New Criticism-inspired teaching, I would argue, has resulted 
in the suppression of (self)critical thinking about teaching 
otherwise. The mode of teaching otherwise that I am calling 
"(self) critical" is elucidated in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE PRAXIS OF (SELF)CRITICAL PEDAGOGY 
[A] freeman ought not to acquire knowledge of any 
kind like a slave. [K]nowledge which is re-
quired under compulsion obtains no hold on the 
mind. 
Socrates, Plato's Republic 
Though often seen in university catalogues and course 
descriptions in many different fields, "critical thinking" 
does not have a widely agreed-upon definition, despite the 
fact most university instructors would probably say that 
critical thinking is something they are trying to encourage 
in their students either implicitly or explicitly. Nearly 
any pedagogical approach can be legitimated by claiming that 
it causes students to "think critically"; the range of teach-
ing methods that critical thinking might be called upon to 
justify is nearly infinite. Teachers who prefer lecturing 
would claim that they are cultivating critical thinking in 
their students; instructors who use mostly class and peer 
group discussion might make a similar claim. I wish to sug-
gest that the academic goal of critical thinking has been in-
adequately theorized, and its practice often plays out as the 
mere acquisition of subject matter instead of intellectual 
work - (self) critical thinking - that is meaningfully 
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(self)critical of both subject matter and the subjects who 
study it. 
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Educational scholarship can provide what have come to be 
the standard definitions of critical thinking, which are then 
utilized in various institutional discourses. Ralph Johnson 
cites three common definitions: 
1) reasonable reflective thinking that is focused 
on deciding what to believe or do; 
2) the skill and propensity to engage in an 
activity with reflective skepticism; 
3) disciplined, self-directed thinking which 
exemplifies the perfection of thinking 
appropriate to a particular mode or domain 
of thinking. (40) 
James Drake describes critical thinking as "the determination 
of the meaning, as well as the acceptability of a statement" 
(30). Joanne Kurfiss provides yet another: "an investigation 
whose purpose is to explore a situation, phenomenon, ques-
tion, or problem to arrive at a hypothesis or conclusion 
about it that integrates all available information and that 
can therefore be convincingly justified" (2). 
Yet I would argue that critical thinking as just defined 
is only the initial step in learning. Pedagogy based on a 
traditional notion of critical thinking does not encourage 
moving to a more complex level of intellectual work. Only 
two of the above definitions even mention such modes of 
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thought as "reflection" or "skepticism" - thinking that is 
more complex. Conventional theorizations of critical think-
ing remain focused on answering a question like "What?" more 
than questions such as "How?" or "Why?" They suppress 
(self)critical thinking in teachers and students, treating 
knowledge as a commodity to be stockpiled, rather than engag-
ing in philosophical speculation about the nature and func-
tion of knowledge. As Sharon Crowley warns: 
[R]eading and writing pedagogies are inevitably 
grounded in theory, whether these theories are 
consciously subscribed to or not. If a peda-
gogical strategy is to be coherent, its teachers 
must articulate its rationale for themselves as 
fully as possible. Such a fully articulated 
rationale will explain why one strategy may be 
preferred to another; more, it will help teachers 
to understand the ideological ramifications of 
their teaching strategies. (Teacher's 29) 
Her argument is also applicable to students. (Self)critical 
pedagogy seeks to encourage students to think about why and 
how they think the way they think, to consider the conditions 
that make it possible to think in a particular way. Critical 
thinking, however, largely fails to account for the role of 
the subject in the processes of intellectual work; it tends 
to theorize learning as an objective intake of information. 
In this chapter, I will describe possibilities for the 

120 
and Peter McLaren provide a useful definition of the kind of 
teaching promoted by (self)critical pedagogy: 
"Pedagogy" refers to the process by which teachers 
and students negotiate and produce meaning. 
A [(self)critical] pedagogy. . is one that is 
necessarily partial and incomplete, one that has 
no final answers. It is always in the making 
(157, 182) 
There are no "final answers" for what may ail education in 
general or the teaching of English in particular. In (self) 
critical pedagogy, I advocate the adoption of a particular 
attitude about teaching, one that constantly calls its own 
presuppositions and subsequent practices into question. 
To a significant extent, such an attitude would be a re-
turn to what Foucault calls "a philosophical interrogation 
. rooted in the Enlightenment," a mode that "problema-
tizes. . the constitution of the self as an autonomous ob-
ject" ("Enlightenment?" 42). Invoking "Kant's reflection," 
Foucault promotes "investigation into the events that have 
led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as 
subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying" - a 
"critical ontology of ourselves" (45). I propose (self) 
critical pedagogy as the educational manifestation of such an 
interrogation or investigation. (Self) critical thought "has 
to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos. . a critique of 
what is at one and the same time the historical analys,is of 
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the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the 
possibility of going beyond them" (50). 
(Self) critical pedagogy is also indebted to contemporary 
critics who have called for what Thomas Kuhn terms a 
"paradigm shift," necessitated by such phenomena as the in-
creasingly heterogenous student bodies in the American uni-
versity and the influence of poststructuralism on English de-
partments. Robert Con Davis is exemplary in his statement 
that "Education has been transformed only when the relations 
of education most broadly are reconstituted" (251). Such 
words as "shift" and "transformed" usefully negate the idea 
that students would be best served simply by throwing out 
older teaching methods and replacing them with newer ones, as 
theorists like Zavarzadeh and Morton argue. Patricia Harkin 
and John Schilb contend that pedagogy "should not mean wor-
shiping certain thinkers or stances but should involve con-
tinually evaluating those stances and envisioning ways to 
modify or even add to their insights" (10). Untheorized 
privileging of the "new" is as problematic as naive reliance 
on the traditional. As Derrida states, "[I]f there's merely 
a reversal" in a hierarchy, "you merely recapitulate the same 
structure you had previously" ("Women" 202). However, a new 
pedagogy should not consist merely of few "new" twists added 
to the old paradigm; new ideas should not be treated as "mere 
additions or increments" to the "stockpile" of knowledge 
(Kuhn 391). What's needed is a pedagogy that is 
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conceptualized differently and not predicated on old (New 
Critical) paradigms - what Dewey called "a new order of 
conceptions leading to new modes of practice" (Experience 5). 
The concept of the paradigm shift is useful to differen-
tiate between (self)critical pedagogy and other "revisionary" 
pedagogies that attempt to incorporate new ideas into tradi-
tional paradigms. Graff's conflict model (discussed in Chap-
ter 1) is an excellent example of how a purported pedagogical 
reform can retain the baggage of tradition. I discovered 
this (unfortunately) after reflecting on my teaching of an 
essay by Jane Tompkins in a writing class.17 Describing how I 
taught the "conflict" in her essay, using a Graffian agree-
to-disagree approach, may shed further light on the problems 
inherent in a pedagogy like Graff's. My comments that follow 
this case study serve, I hope, as an enactment of (self) 
critical thinking, demonstrating that relentless self-
consciousness and self-reflexiveness about one's classroom 
practice can improve one's teaching and students' learning. 
Tompkins' essay, which I taught in an advanced composi-
tion course, describes the process of doing research about 
the relations between native Americans and Puritans in 
colonial America. Stie points out there is a wide range of 
17 "'Indians': Textualism, Morality, and the Problem of 
History" in Critical Inquiry 13.1 (Autumn 1986); reprinted 
in Henry Louis Gates, Jr., ed. Race. Writing. and Difference 
(U of Chicago P, 1986) and David Bartholomae and Anthony Pet-
rosky, eds. Ways of Reading (St. Martin's Press, 1990). 
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theories about who was to blame for the near extermination of 
the "Indians." These interpretations range from very 
traditional accounts to revisionary views. My students had 
been exposed only to "traditional" history, so they found 
what Tompkins describes as the poststructuralist position 
that there is absolutely no way to get back to "what actually 
happened" to assign blame - rather troubling ethically. They 
felt that, even though hundreds of years have elapsed, some 
party must be held responsible for the atrocities. Tompkins 
encourages this posse mentality when she argues that, even 
after poststructuralism, we must still make ethical and moral 
decisions: 
. you [don't] have to accept just anybody's 
facts. You can show that what someone else asserts 
to be a fact is false. But it does mean that you 
can't argue that someone else's facts are not facts 
because they are only the product of a perspective, 
since this will be true of the facts that you 
perceive as well. What this means is that arguments 
about "what happened" have to proceed much as they 
did bPfore poststructuralism broke in with all its 
talk about language-based reality and culturally 
produced knowledge. (577) 
While not totally dismissing poststructuralism as an inter-
pretive method ("when what is under discussion is the way 
that beliefs are grounded"), Tompkins characterizes it as 
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unethical when discussing "the facts of a particular case" 
(577). According to her, one either opts for a moral search 
for the "truth" or a passive acceptance of the world as mere 
language or discourse; she ends the essay by stating that her 
own "poststructuralist" work "is not directed towards solving 
the kinds of problems that studying the history of European-
Indian relations has awakened [her] to" (578). 
I pointed out to my students what I saw as a flaw in 
Tompkins' argument: that if the traditional search for 
"truth" constitutes one end of an interpretive continuum and 
poststructuralism the other, there is considerable space be-
tween the two poles where an individual can construct inter-
pretations that suit the problems at hand. I proposed the 
following "solution" to Tompkins' critical dilemma, one that 
would "solve" both its historical and political dimensions: 
one can agree with the poststructuralist position and recog-
nize that trying to assess responsibility definitively is im-
possible, but still take concrete, political action if one is 
concerned about the situation of Native Americans. This ac-
tion could take the form of lobbying legislators for better 
governmental treatment or supporting social service organi-
zations that address the problems of Native Americans (such 
as the high alcoholism and low literacy rates). Such ac-
tions, I argued, would be much more valuable to society than 
spending that same amount of time attempting to decide who 
was at fault in colonial America. I added that my statement 
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did not mean that studying history is unimportant; I wanted 
to emphasize the necessarily limited powers of traditional 
historical interpretation. 
My little talk did not, of course, dissuade some stu-
dents from taking moralistic positions in their papers on the 
subject, in which they were asked to think of a way through 
Tompkins' ethical dilemma (other than those I had proposed in 
class discussion) . These writers still advocated blaming ei-
ther the Puritans or the "Indians" themselves for the atroci-
ties. Others, however, suggested concrete action such as 
putting one's skills to use in a native American community, 
as a doctor, nurse or social worker; they argued that doing 
so was much more useful than trying to assign blame for past 
harm. 
At the time, I was pleased that some of my students took 
to my idea of an interpretive continuum and potential "useful 
space" in the middle. I was more pleased when, in subsequent 
class discussions about the papers, students seemed to real-
ize that their points of view were only several among many 
others, that their ways of seeing had to compete with oth-
ers', to be taken seriously. 
But in reading (self)critically the text of this teach-
ing to tease out the pedagogical contradictions that, as 
Sharon Crowley argues, "risk confusing students (and teach-
ers) on a fundamental level," I can detect several unexamined 
assumptions on my part that highlight certain problems, in a 
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model such as teaching the conflicts (Teacher's 28). First, 
as I mentioned in Chapter l, what seems to be a conflict to 
academics often won't get a rise out of today's undergradu-
ates, and this is not just because, as Graff thinks, these 
conflicts are hidden from them. Political correctness, for 
example, has been widely publicized both in the mass media 
and the university curriculum, but, for the most part, stu-
dents don't think it's as big a deal as academics do. Less 
publicized conflicts elicit even less student interest. This 
is not to say that Tompkins' general topic - how different 
groups construct their own histories - is not important, but 
it is to argue that how a teacher approaches the topic in her 
pedagogy is crucial. I would have better served my students 
by doing two things differently. First, the writing class, 
with no ostensible subject matter to cover, can provide an 
opportunity to engage in teaching that better accounts for 
students' needs and interests. Such (self)critical teaching 
entails using students' interests and experiences, coordi-
nated and organized by the teacher, as the primary "texts" 
for the writing course. Instead of being provided with a 
"conflict" by the teacher, students bring in texts that they 
see as embodying conflict and that they have some stake or 
investment in. Ira Shor states, "The way students speak, 
feel and think about any subject is the starting point for a 
critical study of themselves, their society and their 
academic subjects" (Empowering 22). Instead of giving my stu-
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dents the conflict, I could have asked them to provide one. 
Alternatively, if I had decided to keep Tompkins' con-
flict, I still could have engaged the students differently, 
by not presenting them with a "solution" to Tompkins' 
"dilemma" at the beginning of our discussion. Instead, I 
could have let them voice their reactions to the essay, as a 
starting point. This could have led to better discussion, 
since their experiences reading an article from Critical In-
quiry was most likely much different than mine. Trying to 
imagine how I might have read Tompkins' essay as an 18-year-
old, I might have commented about the assumptions academics 
make about their audience when they write. Such a discussion 
about rhetorical, intellectual and class assumptions would be 
potentially interesting, and, most importantly, it would be a 
conflict generated by students, not by a teacher. 
Another criticism of the way I taught Tompkins' essay 
concerns her characterization of poststructuralism in this 
essay, which is misleading and uncharacteristic of the 
theoretical positions she has taken in other instances.18 I 
quote again from "'Indians'": 
Being aware that all facts are motivated, 
believing that people are always operating inside 
some particular interpretive framework or other is 
18 See "The Reader in History: The Changing Shape of 
Literary Response" in her Reader-Response Criticism (Johns 
Hopkins UP, 1980); and, especially, "A Short Course in Post-
Structuralism" in College English 50.7 (Nov. 1988). 
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a pertinent argument when what is under discussion 
is the way beliefs are grounded. But it doesn't 
give one any leverage on the facts of a particular 
case. (577) 
She footnotes this passage: "The position I've been outlining 
is a version of neopragmatism. For an exposition, see 
Against Theory: Literary Studies and the New Pragmatism, ed. 
W. J. T. Mitchell (Chicago, 1985)" (fn. 21, 579). Tompkins 
aligns herself with the "neo-" or "new pragmatists" like 
Stanley Fish, who joined with Stephen Knapp and Walter Benn 
Michaels' "Against Theory" movement. In his essay "Conse-
quences," a follow-up to Knapp and Michaels, Fish "agreed 
that 'theory's day is dying' " (White 4) . 
Neopragmatism and the conflict model share similar as-
sumptions. She overcomes the conflict in her essay - the 
problem of "history" - by admitting that history is con-
structed, but that such an admission doesn't change the way 
one should interpret history. In other words, one accepts a 
different (poststructuralist) definition of history (in 
Graff's terms, one •agrees" about this) and goes on about 
one's business as before ("disagreeing" about who gets the 
blame for whatever historical event). The idea of construct~ 
edness that comes out of poststructuralism really isn't im-
portant, for one keeps interpreting in the same way. 
In my teaching, I did not confront what I believed to be 
Tompkins' misrepresentation of poststructuralism. Instead, I 
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tacitly agreed to disagree with her by attempting to use her 
paradigm to "solve" her "problem." I bought into her opposi-
tion of poststructuralism versus "traditional history" and 
urged my students to find a middle ground. Intent on making 
this "conflict" seem important to my students, I dictated 
what their responses should be: either take my "poststruc-
turalist" "solution" or the "traditional," "historical" view. 
I discouraged students from thinking (self)critically and 
constructing their own meanings - which is, it seems to me, 
the most serious problem with the conflict model. It assumes 
that students' experiences and interests are secondary to 
academic disagreements about texts in helping students im-
prove their thinking, reading and writing skills. Graff's 
model remains in the realm of what Freire calls the "banking 
model of education. 11 19 
19 Tompkins has argued ("Teaching Like It Matters," Linaua 
Franca, August 1991) that Freire's concept of "banking" edu-
cation is perhaps too harsh to describe mainstream American 
pedagogy. She writes, 
We have class discussion, we have oral reports, we 
have student participation of various kinds - stu-
dents often choose their own paper topics, suggest 
additional readings, propose issues for discussion. 
As far as most of us are concerned, the banking 
model is obsolete. (24) 
She maintains, instead, that we have to contend with the 
"performance model," in which "we teach our students how to 
perform within an institutional academic setting in such a 
way that they will be thought highly of by their colleagues 
and instructors" (24-25). 
Rather than trying to "prove" which model is more preva-
lent today, I would argue that performance pedagogy is a 
logical American extension of the banking model. That is, 
few instructors at American universities adhere strictly to 
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Banking education, Freire's now-infamous idea, is 
pedagogy in which students are "patient, listening objects," 
empty vessels waiting to be filled (57). In the banking 
method, "the teacher choo.ses the program content, and the 
students (who were not consulted) adapt to it" (59). In 
teaching the conflicts, 
a department or college. . decides that in the 
coming semester some or all of its courses will 
have a common theme. . Having determined the 
theme, instructors (with interested students) 
choose two or three common texts, which will help 
give focus to the theme. (Graff, "Other" 835-
36, emphasis added) 
Such a scenario is my Tompkins episode writ large. Graff im-
plies that the most conscientious students will help deter-
mine the content of courses. But one wonders, if Graff is 
correct about students being shielded from conflicts, how 
does one find any students to participate in the setup who 
are knowledgeable about the conflicts? And if those students 
the banking modt.ol today; America is about "progress" and 
"democracy," so most teachers allow such activities as 
Tompkins mentions. But, the "payoff" they obtain from 
performance pedagogy affects students in ways that are "no 
less coercive [and] no less destructive of creativity and 
self-motivated learning" than banking pedagogy. Thus, it 
seems to me performance pedagogy is but a kinder, gentler 
banking method of teaching that may or may not be more 
widespread than strict "banking" education. In their effects 
on students, it seems to me they are virtually indistiguish-
able, so I will refer to teaching that produces these kinds 
of effects on students as "banking" methods henceforth. 
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can be found, aren't they functioning in much the same way as 
the instructors, imposing particular texts on classes? 
Though teaching the conflicts initially may seem to be a way 
to teach differently, I would argue - both theoretically and 
from personal experience - that it fails to liberate teachers 
and students from traditional, "banking" subject positions. 
A first move toward (self)critical pedagogy requires re-
thinking the idea of subjectivity or subject construction 
as it pertains to the English classroom. Gregory Jay pro-
poses a redefinition based on the metaphor of the imposter: 
"Teachers are imposters, though no more so than their stu-
dents, and education ought to disclose the structures and ar-
ticulate the consequences of the postures we have assumed or 
imposed" (315). The pedagogical subject as imposter is a 
functional metaphor for the redefinition of the pedagogical 
subject as splintered and conflicting, rather than whole and 
harmonious. Foucault describes this as "the different modes 
by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects" 
("Subject" 208). One of these modes is the naturalization of 
"the traditional rational man standard (the straight, white, 
male, Christian, English-speaking, middle-class individual-
ist)" as the "universal measure" by which subjects are cate-
gorized (Perry and Williams 230). This postmodern conception 
of the subject relates to teaching in terms of what might be 
called the "teacher function" and the "student function." 
Following Foucault's notion of the function of the aut·hor, 
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the subject of/in pedagogy may be retheorized similarly: 
The author's name serves to characterize a certain 
mode of being of discourse: the fact that this 
discourse has an author's name. . shows that 
this discourse is not ordinary everyday speech 
that comes and goes. . On the contrary, it is 
a speech that must be received in a certain mode 
and that, in a given culture, must receive a 
certain status. . The author's name manifests 
the appearance of a certain discursive set and 
indicates the status of this discourse within a 
society and a culture. ("Author?" 107) 
That is, teachers and students function as "authors" of 
"texts" continuously. Their discourses mark them within ped-
agogy as teachers and students and construct them as subjects 
in/of pedagogy; they cannot think, read and write "as they 
please." Acknowledging that human beings are not "free 
agents," that they do not participate in education neutrally 
or innocently, and that they are conditioned to function 
within particular relations of power in the classroom produc-
tively redefines "teacher" and "student" as discursive func-
tions rather than autonomous selves. In its consideration of 
power relations, this redefinition also highlights the "dif-
ferences of gender, race and class among students and teach-
ers [that] provide situations in which conflict does arise" 
(Jarratt 113). That is, difference in the classroom is ex-
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plored seriously as the effect of relations of power v1s-a-
vis the subject, rather than being dismissed or sublimated to 
reach a consensus. 
Such a redefinition of the subject undermines the idea 
of the teacher as "transmitter" of knowledge. In this com-
monplace kind of pedagogy, a teacher "cognizes a cognizable 
object while he prepares his lessons in his study. [and 
then] he expounds to his students about that object" (Freire 
67-68). While this pedagogy may be more common in scientific 
disciplines and some humanities fields, it is still easily 
discernable in English departments. Most of my undergraduate 
education and a significant amount of my graduate training 
were exercises in this pervasive pedagogical model, whose ad-
herents assume that the "neutral" transmission of "objective 
knowledge" is the primary function of the teacher. Dewey 
writes that this kind of "learning" 
means acquisition of what already is incorporated 
in books and in the heads of elders. [T]hat 
which is taught is thought of as essentially. 
a finished product. . It is to a large extent 
the cultural product of societies that assumed the 
future would be much like the past, and yet it is 
used as educational food in a society where change 
is the rule, not the exception. (Experience 19) 
Rejecting the teacher-as-transmitter model requires a 
concomitant disavowal of the student-as-receptacle presuppo-
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sition. The popularity of the latter characterization has 
increased since the advent of the "literacy crisis." It has 
become fashionable in some circles to blame the ignorance of 
students for any number of educational and social problems. 
Students know a great deal about many topics, but their 
knowledge is illegitimate to certain "experts" on education 
- Kimball, Dinesh D'Souza, George Will et al. That is, stu-
dents' "blank slates" have in fact been written upon, but not 
in "acceptable" ways. Conservatives' emphasis on reiterating 
the knowledge and authority of the teacher reveals their 
"political opposition to student participation because [of] 
it[s] challenge [to] power relations in school and society" 
(Shor Empowering 33). 
Viewing students as empty boxes awaiting teachers' de-
posits of knowledge also leads teachers to blame "lazy," "ap-
athetic" or, most euphemistically, "unreceptive" students for 
the failure of "education." Regrettably, it was only in the 
last few years that it occurred to me that I was a large part 
of the problem. Of course, there are many students who will 
resist any kind of pedagogy, even the best teaching efforts. 
These cases, however, are rarer than one might think; and, I 
would argue, teaching practices which more closely involve 
students in their own educations have a stronger possibility 
than traditional approaches of alleviating such problems. 
Involving students more closely in their learning 
requires a signifi~ant emphasis on their experiences. 
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Stanley Aronowitz and Henry Giroux call for "taking seriously 
and confirming the language forms, modes of reasoning, 
dispositions, and histories that give students an active 
voice in defining the world" (104). But this move also 
entails "working on the experiences of. . students in order 
for them to examine both their strengths and weaknesses" 
(104). That is, to take seriously the materials students 
bring into the classroom - the knowledge they already possess 
- is not "a static entrapment in what students already know 
and say" (Shor Empowering 44). Neither is it to engage in 
the relativism that conservatives think pervades the 
university, in which all interpretations are equal and 
canonical texts go unread. (Self)critical pedagogy simply 
acknowledges that any ostensible topic or theme of a course 
is actually more about the subject positions students and 
teachers assume (and the interpretations that are 
subsequently produced) in relation to that topic than it is 
"about" the topic itself. 
Theorizing about subject positions, however, does not 
have to result in "purely academic" discussions about the 
death of the subject or the disappearance of the individual. 
Stephen Ungar writes that critics of Foucault complain that 
he "trace[s] the disappearance of the individual within the 
impersonality of institutionalized discourse" (92). This 
view - anti-Foucault, anti-Barthes, etc. - is reductive and 
limits the valuable contributions that Foucault and ofher 
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poststructuralists can make to pedagogical theory. A Carte-
sian conception of the individual does not have to be recu-
perated to enact pedagogical change. Foucault writes, 
Of course, it would be ridiculous to deny the 
individµals who write. and invent. But the 
individual who sits down to write a text. 
resumes the function of the author. What he writes 
and does not write, what he sketches out. . all 
this interplay of differences is prescribed by the 
author-function. It is from his new position as an 
author that he will fashion. all he says. 
("Discourse" 222, emphasis added) 
Foucault describes the postmodern subject who is able to 
think, read, write or teach in any number of ways, but who is 
constituted in a given subject position within a particular 
institutional context. Far from being "confined" by the no-
tion of subject functions, teachers and students can begin to 
examine (self)critically the grounds for their institutional 
behaviors and work toward adapting them for desired goals. 
(Self)critical examination of institutional behavior in-
evitably leads to a reconception of what counts as knowledge. 
Following Lacan, Shoshana Felman writes that "knowledge is 
what is already there, but always in the Other. Knowledge, 
in other words, is not a substance but a structural dynamic: 
it is not contained by any individual . ( 33) . 
Similarly, in (self)critical pedagogy, knowledge is not a 
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tangible object to be passed on from teacher to student. 
Knowledge production should entail continual classroom nego-
tiations among teachers and students about what counts (or 
might count) as knowledge, but not simple exercises in 
consensus building. Consensus is a comforting notion for 
some (Rorty, Graff et al.}, but it largely effaces important, 
irreducible differences of class, gender, race, religious be-
lief, sexual orientation and many others. Foucault questions 
whether a concept such as "consensus" is even possible, since 
any consensus "reached•• inevitably poses another question 
that demands another consensus as an answer. As he argues, 
"'the "we" [of a consensus] must not be previous to the ques-
tion; it can only be the result - and the necessarily tempo-
rary result - of the question as it is posed in the new terms 
in which one formulates it' " ("Polemics" 3 85) . It is irre-
sponsible to give students the impression that arriving at a 
consensus will "solve" a problem; that differences can be 
sublimated easily if everyone agrees, or agrees to disagree; 
that power and knowledge magically emanate from consensus. 
"Power produces knowledge. [P]ower and knowledge di-
rectly imply one another," Foucault notes, but power "is not 
by nature the manifestation of a consensus" ("Body" 175; 
"Subject" 219). 
Therefore, knowledge is inherently political, in the 
sense of Terry Eagleton's definition: "the way we organize 
our social life together, and the power-relations which this 
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involves" (194). This wider definition encompasses the mate-
rial effects of knowledge production and consumption: "All 
knowledge. . does something to someone, benefits and op 
presses, empowers some and deprives others - exists, in 
short, as a dimension of work with an effect in the world" 
(Davis 264). Knowledge "operates through acts of exclusion 
and marginalization," as Michael Ryan states (53). Students 
should be made aware of the ramifications of the fact that 
knowledge is not value-neutral, that "official" knowledge is 
created through exercises of political and institutional 
power. But (self)critical pedagogy would deal with a disci-
plinary "conflict" like the politics of knowledge in a dif-
ferent manner than the conflict model would, in less of a 
top-down fashion. Students' experiences are rich and varied 
enough that, at some point in almost any course that encour-
aged (self) critical thinking, I suspect they would broach the 
topic of what counts as knowledge in the context of class 
discussion and/or research. Teaching the conflicts, however, 
assumes students have a stake in a given conflict; (self) 
critical pedagogy teases out what concerns students in the 
contexts of their experiences and interests. The next section 
provides further examples. 
While most revisionary pedagogies seek to eliminate the 
literature/composition hierarchy, one may also have to devise 
more-local strategies to change pedagogy that provisionally 
acknowledge the power of existing structures toward the end 
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of deconstructing them. These structures - administrators' 
attitudes, "recommended" textbooks and handbooks, course of-
ferings - cannot be wished away. They are "norms [that] are 
firmly in place," supported by "hundreds of minor and arbi-
trary truths. taken for granted, unchallenged, accepted 
as inevitable" (Clifford 43). For composition, two proposi-
tions can be made. Though John Schilb, among others, "wor-
ries" about writing teachers who "retain the service ethos or 
residues of it,"20 I would argue that one may work against 
that institutional assumption by having (self)critical compo-
sition teachers team-teaching core curriculum or general edu-
cation courses with the "experts" in those disciplines (178). 
Just as the production of knowledge should involve teacher-
student negotiation, what counts as "good" writing in politi-
cal science, for example, could be negotiated among teachers 
and students and made a part of the course. This is differ-
ent from the conflict model, however, in that the "conflict" 
of what is good writing arises from particular pieces of 
student writing, not predetermined academic disagreements. 
Instead of "Writing Across the Curriculum" (which, unfortu-
20 The work of noted composition scholar Kenneth Bruffee is 
an example of Schilb's fear: "Much of what we teach today --
or should be teaching -- in composition courses is the normal 
discourse of most academic, professional and business commu-
nities. [A]s Rorty has put it, [education is] a process 
of learning to 'take a hand in what is going on' by joining 
'the conversation of mankind.'" See "Collaborative Learning 
and the 'Conversation of Mankind'" in College English 46.7 
(November 1984), pp. 643, 647. 
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nately, sometimes means to non-English faculty: "I guess I 
have to grade three papers instead of two"), there would be 
"Writing-in-Virtually-Every-Freshman-Course." Perhaps compo-
sitionists could venture into higher-level courses in other 
disciplines as well. Calling for "critical-democratic learn-
ing across the curriculum," Shor maintains that "Every con-
tent area, from biology to economics to accounting to archi-
tecture, can pose its subject matter as critical problems re-
lated to social conditions and student experience" (Empower-
ing 187). Although one might argue that this idea simply 
reinscribes stereotypes about composition, this effort would 
be preferable to the way that many composition programs cur-
rently operate, as service entities uninvolved in any kind of 
pedagogical experimentation. 
John Clifford notes, 
"[T]he teaching of writing," 
is inevitably an ideological act and thereby one 
part of any culture's attempt to reproduce itself, 
both intellectually and economically by creating 
accommodating students who are eager to fill 
designated positions of influence within various 
institutional landscapes. (39) 
(Self)critical pedagogy can disrupt this process, especially 
if it takes place in both English and non-English courses. 
A second proposal - which could take place in an insti-
tution more amenable to experimentation - entails conducting 
a writing course in an explicitly (self) critical manner that 
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would take students' experiences, interests and needs as the 
main focus, absent ostensible subject matter (authors, peri-
ods, movements) to cover. Students' interests and experi-
ences, coordinated and organized by the teacher, would serve 
as the primary "textsfl for the writing course. Instead of 
being provided with a "conflict" by the teacher, students 
would bring in texts of all kinds in which they have some 
stake or investment. I suspect teachers would be surprised 
at the importance and weightiness of the issues that students 
want to discuss. Such a course could proceed as follows: the 
instructor walks in the first day without a textbook or a 
syllabus; instructor and students generate a list of topics 
that reflect their experiences and interests what they 
know, what they would like to know more about; they choose 
several topics on which to focus for the semester, and 
students organize themselves into research groups that will 
be responsible for presenting the topic to the whole class; 
each group collects several short texts that treat each topic 
(with assistance from the instructor if needed) and gives 
them to her for duplication and dissemination to the entire 
class. This approach "imbues" students "with a sense of the 
writing process as multifaceted, evolving and exploratory" 
(Clifford 46). 
However, teaching writing in this way does not rely on 
the currently fashionable "process" approach (promoted in 
such textbooks as the St. Martin's Guide) with its "dozens of 
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discrete steps and scores of self-purifying questions about 
coherence devices and structuring techniques," which 
"forge[s] a truly constructed subject, corrnnitted primarily to 
reinscribing the obvious and the known in hypercorrect and 
bloodless prose" (48}. This regulatory apparatus is usually 
suffused with a rhetoric of "empowerment students" and an 
aura of the "harmonious, nurturing" classroom (Vitanza 157; 
Jarratt 113). Such a passive-aggressive model is, according 
to Victor Vitanza, "the biggest hoax ever perpetrated on 'the 
student body'" (157). The process paradigm provides false 
security; it is a pedagogy that 
theoriz[es] the individual as "free" yet at the 
same time subjected to the "authority" of a higher 
power [and] preserves the notion of the free person 
who can enter into transactions with other free 
persons in the free market - but who is, at the 
same time, obedient to the free-market values that 
legitimize the existing political order. 
( Zavarzadeh <md Morton 3) 
Process pedagogy may be even more insidious and pervasive 
than traditional composition instruction in that it is osten-
sibly less authoritarian and more student-centered. But 
there is little difference at the scene of teaching; even 
prominent advocates of process insist that their research 
shows "writing is goal-directed [and] writing processes are 
hierarchically organized~ - hardly a theoretical leap·from 
143 
current-traditional rhetoric (Hayes and Flower 388). This 
attachment to tradition and hesitance to embrace new theories 
is an example of how, according to Sharon Crowley, "the com-
position establishi'uent rewrites or simply resists theories 
that threaten its preservation instead of foraging through 
them in an effort to rethink itself and its potential com-
plicity with traditional academic values" ("Reimagining" 
192). The only significant process in the process model is 
students being processed through what Susan Miller calls "the 
textual carnival of correctness, propriety and 'good breed-
ing I II ( 91) • 
(Self)critical pedagogy rejects this "repressive ideal 
of perfectly written texts," retheorizing writing using both 
"composition" and "literary" theories (91). David Bartholo-
mae and Anthony Petrosky argue that 
it is hard to distinguish the act of reading 
from the act of writing. In fact, the connection 
between reading and writing can be seen as almost 
a literal one, since the best way you can show 
your reading of a rich and dense essay. . lS by 
writing down your thoughts, placing one idea 
against another, commenting on what you've done, 
taking examples into account, looking back at 
where you began, perhaps changing your mind, and 
moving on. (Ways 2nd ed. 12-13) 
Writing, in this view, is something that humans do con-
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stantly, often unconsciously; "thinking" or "reading" is mak-
ing meaning or "writing" interpretations. As Crowley puts 
it, "[T]he instigation of writing simply cannot be isolated 
from its contexts. which are myriad" (Teacher's 38). This 
poststructuralist view opens possibilities for students in 
both of my composition scenarios. In the first, students can 
see writing as, in Janet Emig's useful phrase, a mode of 
learning and that the act of writing can help one understand 
whatever topic is being studied. In the second, students can 
use writing (in journals, for instance) to explore the many 
subject positions they assume in their lives. Reconceiving 
writing in this way detaches it from its historical constitu-
tion as "a national course in silence," "a method of disci-
pline," "a field of surveillance [in which] one had to define 
the aptitude of each individual, situate his level and his 
abilities, indicate the possible use that might be made of 
them. 
2 01) . 
II (Miller 55; Dewey Experience 17; Foucault "Means" 
This view of writing and the composition course is also 
important for (self)critical pedagogy in the literature 
classroom. For example, I accentuate the connections among 
reading, writing and thinking by conducting literature 
courses along much the same lines as writing courses. 
Individual assignments are not graded; students write weekly 
reaction papers and use them as a basis for longer essays. 
There are numerous student conferences, in which they·receive 
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oral and written feedback on their performance in the course 
and are asked to comment on their own progress in the course 
and the conduct of the course in general. During class meet-
ings, there are few (if any) lectures; pairs of students are 
responsible for leading discussions each day. All of these 
approaches foreground, for students, that "education" and 
"knowledge" are not static processes or concepts, that they 
need to be (self)critical and self-aware of their progress in 
the course. I, the students and the conducting of the course 
itself undergo continous self-analysis and critique. 
Other (self)critical techniques involve the subject mat-
ter of literature courses. For instance, instructors tend to 
teach the same courses repeatedly and usually don't turn over 
the reading lists substantially from year to year. Therefore, 
literature teachers often possess stale, stock interpreta-
tions about the literature they teach, which they continue to 
promulgate. (Self) critical pedagogy urges changing reading 
lists as often as possible, even assigning texts that teach-
ers have never read before (or at least haven't taught re-
cently), and/or, better yet, allowing students to choose the 
texts they wish to read. 
One potential drawback to these actions is that the 
workload for the teacher could become overly heavy. However, 
my experiences using both techniques have been almost en-
tirely positive, in courses ranging from sophomore introduc-
tory courses to upper-level period courses for English 
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majors. In a typical course, for about one-half of the 
semester, I assign works I have not yet read, written by au-
thors with whom I am familiar. (In a contemporary literature 
course, I used Don DeLillo's Mao II and Donald Barthelme's 
The King.) I have found that proceeding in this way allows 
me to provide adequate biographical and historical background 
(if class needs dictate), but frees both me and my students 
from silence-filling stock comments to which I might resort 
if I had taught the text many times before. 
During the other half term, students choose what they 
would like to read from texts that we both bring in that are 
appropriate for the course. Through several rounds of voting 
(and negotiation), the texts that the most students wanted to 
read are chosen. A good mixture of genres, authors, etc. is 
usually chosen, because I allow students considerable time to 
make relatively knowledgeable choices. (In some cases, 
students have taken it upon themselves to research particular 
authors to make better-informed decisions.) Most 
importantly, because students have a stake in choosing what 
they read, they are usually much more interested in the 
material, and more-engaging class discussions result. And, 
as with the previous technique, I cannot dominate our meeting 
time with my commentary. 
In (self) critical literary pedagogy, students can bene-
fit from the fact that teachers present texts unencumbered by 
years of stock responses. However, this is to advocat·e nei-
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ther a naive nor a "just read the text" approach; rather, 
students are better served by approaching texts on footing 
nearer to their teachers and less afraid to voice responses 
if they know their teacher is reading the text for the first 
time as well. The need exists, of course, in particular 
kinds of courses, to give students historical background 
about literature. However, even this need can be addressed 
differently. Instead of lecturing about the Elizabethan 
world picture, for example, students can investigate the his-
torical background themselves, perhaps finding new and dif-
ferent sources than those on which teachers usually rely. 
Approaches such as these might lessen the often negative ped-
agogical implications of classroom power relations. There 
will, of course, always be power relations in the classroom; 
(self) critical pedagogy neither romanticizes the subject of 
pedagogy nor assumes that power is unequivocably bad. It 
seeks, rather, to alter power relations and subject positions 
to allow for the construction of (self)critical subjects, 
"students [who] read and writ2 and think in ways that. 
encourage self-consciousness about who they are and can be in 
the social worldn (Clifford 51). 
To provide a more concrete example of (self)critical 
pedagogy in the literature classroom, I can report on my 
experiences coordinating a poetry course that evidenced both 
the advantages and difficulties of teaching differently. I 
was fortunate to team-t~ch this course, a typical poetry 
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survey. Such a setup aids (self) critical teaching in both 
logistical and philosophical/theoretical ways. We were able 
to allow students to experience several different pedagogical 
configurations - p4irs. small and large discussion groups 
with which we could interact more meaningfully as a duo. I 
often found that teaching solo, I sometimes couldn't get to 
- or could spend only a few minutes with - pairs of students. 
These various configurations were necessitated by our firm 
belief in choosing the subject matter for course democrat-
ically. As a first assignment, students perused the Norton 
Introduction to Poetry (our only required text) and several 
other texts we provided, chose three poems each and wrote a 
rationale for their choices. We photocopied this material 
and distributed it to the entire class. As their next 
assignment, students read through their peers' choices and 
came to the next class prepared to vote on our semester's 
reading. 
The voting was enlightening in several ways. First, 
many students, especic:.lly white, middle- to upper-class 
males, chose the most canonical poems: Frost, Dickinson et 
al., those from their previous educational experience. Other 
class members, notably wo~en, persons of color and white eth-
nics, chose the work of poets from their respective social 
and ethnic communities - Adrienne Rich, Ishmael Reed, Seamus 
Heaney, Gloria Anzaldua, Maya Angelou and others. Our 
students seemed reluctant to choose any poem outside their 
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fairly immediate range of experience. 
However, the range and number of poems chosen, and the 
reality of having to make decisions about which to read, pro-
vided some lively {self)critical discussion during the rounds 
of voting. We talked out why they chose particular poems, 
what those choices reflected about their previous education 
and their life experiences. We discussed the nature of lit-
erature anthologies and how and why students had these col-
lections from which to make their choices - how editors had, 
in a profound way, already limited their choices. We argued 
about whether rock music lyrics were poetry and whether we 
should bring some of those texts into our course. 
The students significantly changed our vision of how the 
course would proceed - and we could not have been more 
pleased. The poems chosen through the election process were 
complemented by rock lyrics and students' poems; a paper as-
signment was jettisoned in favor of attending a live poetry 
reading and reporting ,on it; presented with a choice, most 
students opted not to receive grades on individual assign-
ments. In fact, soon after the semester had begun, we 
stopped collecting individual assignments and started evalu-
ating students' writing portfolio-style, with the writing as~ 
signments deriving from class discussions. And all of this 
came from the group whose members contributed some of the 
student comments in Chapter 3 (see page 79 ff.). My 
recollections of the course are reminiscent of those I have 
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of an undergraduate creative writing course - a class 
structured as a workshop, with students trying new and 
different things without fear of failure (i.e. poor grades), 
a community of thinkers, readers and writers utilizing, not 
sublimating, their differences as occasions for (self) 
criticism and the production of knowledge. This course was 
the best enactment of (self)critical pedagogy I have ex-
perienced; our excitement was such that we soon delivered a 
presentation about it at a meeting of the Illinois branch of 
the National Council of Teachers of English. We were pleas-
antly surprised how a group largely consisting of high school 
teachers found our approach to be interesting and potentially 
useful. While it would be naive to say that the way we 
taught this course is universally applicable, the fact that 
(self) critical pedagogy may have the potential to also affect 
secondary school teaching is an important additional argument 
for its consideration. 
The anthropologist Margaret Mead once said, "The only 
answer to change is more change" (ii). Her words describe 
the educational situation English teachers face today. Stu-
dents have changed along lines of race, ethnicity, class, and 
gender; the literary canon and disciplinary fields of inter-
est have been restructured as well. But what has not changed 
a great deal in English studies (especially on the literary 
side) is pedagogy. What literary works mean, or what is 
rhetorically effective writing, is not immutable - and the 
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ways in which these values are taught should not be unchange-
able either. (Self)critical pedagogy encourages this recog-
nition to respond more critically and conscientiously to the 
needs, experiences and interests of today's increasingly het-
erogenous student population. Teachers who concur with Mead 
must lead this movement; in Chapter 5, what I see as the re-
sponsibilities of those who seek pedagogical change will be 
described - noting the various institutional, disciplinary 
and political barriers that confront the pedagogue as public 
intellectual and some of the consequences that may lay ahead 
if pedagogical change is not enacted. 
CHAPTER 5 
TEACHING AS SCHOLARSHIP IN ENGLISH STUDIES 
What is constant in the context of university 
teaching is the academy itself, with its 
hierarchies. 
Sharon Crowley, "Jacques Derrida on 
Teaching and Rhetoric: A Response" 
The present study is, among other things, an attempt to 
work through an unexamined paradox: English teachers spend 
little time intellectualizing about that which makes the pro-
fession possible - teaching. This is so obvious a point that 
conservative critics of higher education have often made it, 
but few English teachers seem to acknowledge that their 
livelihood exists only through students' (and their parents') 
wallets. No one is paying bills through writing journal ar-
ticles or books. 
This is not to say that the majority of English teachers 
do not care about teaching or are otherwise irresponsible. 
My point is that the discipline is set up to function in such 
a way that teachers go largely unrewarded for reflection on 
their teaching; colleges don't hold the equivalent of sec-
ondary school in-service workshops, where teachers are re-
quired to attend, but are paid and released from a day of 
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teaching to learn more about teaching. 
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In postsecondary edu-
cation, practitioner lore is popular; teachers rely on a 
vague notion of "what works" instead of exploring the theo-
ries that underpin their practice. Consequently, teachers of-
ten shirk their responsibilities to students, not only as 
teachers, but also as public intellectuals. In this chapter, 
I will discuss the various hindrances both inside and outside 
the academy to doing scholarly work about pedagogy, how they 
might be overcome, and what the consequences of not overcom-
ing them might be. 
Foucault describes how every society, institution or 
discourse erects a "general politics of truth" - that is, a 
system of rules that governs which types of discourse are le-
gitimate and what kinds are not (73). I have argued through-
out this study that the politics of truth, or "regime," that 
structures English departments is New Criticism. This system 
of rules, which Foucault terms "internal," are "rules con-
cerned with the principles of classification, ordering and 
distribution" (Discourse 220). His discussion of the inter-
nal rules that govern a discourse is first directed toward 
what he calls "commentary" or what might be termed "criti-
cism" or "theory" - that is, writing that comments on prior 
writing. Foucault articulates the relationship between "sec-
ondary" texts ("commentary") and "primary" texts, as follows: 
[I]n what we generally refer to as commentary, the 
difference between primary text and secondary text 
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plays two interdependent roles. On the one hand, 
it permits us to create new discourses ad 
infinitum: the top-heaviness of the original text, 
its permanence* its status as discourse ever 
capable of being brought up to date, the multiple 
or hidden meanings with which it is credited, the 
reticence and wealth it is believed to contain, 
all this creates an open possibility for dis-
cussion. On the other hand, whatever the tech-
niques employed, commentary's only role is to 
say finally, what has been silently articulated 
deep down. It must - and the paradox is ever-
changing yet inescapable - say, for the first time, 
what has already been said, and repeat tirelessly 
what was, nevertheless, never said. (Discourse 
221) 
The internal rules that govern a discipline, however, are 
different: 
In a discipline, unlike in commentary, what is 
supposed at the point of departure is not some 
meaning which must be rediscovered, not an 
identity to be reiterated; it is that which is 
required for the construction of new statements. 
For a discipline to exist, there must be the 
possibility of formulating - and of doing so ad 
infinitum - fresh propositions. (Discourse-223) 
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Though Foucault does not explore the relationship between 
"commentary" and "disciplines," I wish to draw upon his ideas 
to discuss how the two terms are related with respect to the 
workings of English departments. 
Although "criticism" and "theory" are not synonymous, I 
will refer to them together as "criticism" in the following 
discussion, in the sense that they are both "secondary" texts 
or "commentary" upon "primary" texts. English as a disci-
pline requires that criticism adhere to a notion of legiti-
macy; it must comment on a primary text in a systematic way 
and produce a new reading of that text. But, as Foucault 
points out, these standards are inherently paradoxical; crit-
icism must be "original" yet "faithful" to the primary text. 
Criticism must articulate what was silent "deep down" in the 
primary text; it must make intelligible what was previously 
unintelligible but present. Extending this line of reasoning 
to encompass "disciplines," one can then postulate that the 
relationship of commentary to a discipline is structurally 
similar to the relationship of commentary to primary texts. 
That is, when one does scholarly work about a discipline, one 
is mandated to generate "fresh propositions" (to "belong to" 
and "uphold" the discipline); yet, simultaneously, one must 
produce criticism that uncovers and explains what was already 
there. Simply stated, to perform "useful" work in a disci-
pline is largely to conform to what are considered the 
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important objects of study; propositions, that is, should not 
be too fresh. 
The primary texts or objects of study in English depart-
ments are obviously cultural texts and history, particular 
authors, genres and so forth. Increasingly, at certain insti-
tutions, student writing and the history of writing instruc-
tion have become acceptable texts for scholarly pursuits. 
However, what almost completely subsidizes the study of all 
other objects - teaching - is not nearly as acceptable as a 
scholarly pursuit. If one were to ask any parent of a col-
lege student what her tuition payment is "buying," she would 
probably say "knowledge." However, teachers know that tu-
ition doesn't necessarily buy "knowledge" (teachers can't 
make students learn), but it does "buy" "teaching" - profes-
sors talking in classrooms. Therefore, teaching (or, to put 
it more broadly to include both teaching "theory" and "prac-
tice," pedagogy) would seem to be an extremely important ob-
ject of study, a crucial primary text of the discipline of 
English. 
But this is not the case, for several reasons. First, 
only in the last 12 to 15 years has pedagogy reached a status 
that might be called a subdiscipline; "theory" and "composi-
tion" have had similar histories as they had to carve out 
disciplinary space from "literature" and "rhetoric." The 
1982 Yale French Studies issue entitled "The Pedagogical Im-
perative" marked the advent of this critical venue. Thus, 
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the study of pedagogy as a field or subdiscipline within En-
glish has only a brief history. Second, although an increas-
ing amount of work on pedagogy is being performed, it is in-
teresting to note who is doing this work. These pedagogical 
theorists range from deconstructionists (Barbara Johnson, 
Gayatri Spivak) to feminists (Paula Treichler, Chris Weedon) 
to compositionists (Sharon Crowley, Elizabeth Flynn) to lit-
erary-turned-cultural critics (Robert Scholes, Gerald Graff, 
Stanley Fish) to theorists from other disciplines (Henry 
Giroux, Stanley Aronowitz). These are by no means homogenous 
voices, but there is one denominator that unites them all: 
they began their scholarly careers in traditional fields, in 
projects deemed "acceptable" by their respective institu-
tions. My point here is not to diminish anyone's accomplish-
ments in pedagogical scholarship; rather, what interests me 
is the situation that one must "pay dues" early on in an aca-
demic career by doing "acceptable" work. After one does this 
- in a dissertation, then a book or two, perhaps - then one 
can choose more iconoclastic scholarly options, such as peda-
gogy. 
The third reason that pedagogical study meets with dis-
ciplinary and institutional resistance (which overlaps with 
the first two) is the age-old conflict between tradition and 
innovation. This conflict is manifested in various ways and 
to varying degrees in subfields in English; new historicism, 
for example, has had notable effects on Renaissance studies 
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in the last ten years, while postmodern criticism has begun 
to affect Old English and medieval scholarship. The disci-
plinary situation of pedagogical studies is more difficult to 
describe. Its ostensible subject matter - teaching practices 
- is a vast network of texts that is impossible to "read." 
That is, a significant body of work has been produced in the 
last ten years about teaching college literature and writing 
classes, but to what extent this work has affected how En-
glish courses are actually taught is debatable. Teaching 
tends to be a "subject" that most teachers feel they already 
"know," just as they "know" Othello or The Great Gatsby. I 
am not saying that most teachers are not open to learning 
more about Shakespeare or Fitzgerald; my point is that there 
is much more at stake for teachers - both professionally and 
personally - in making decisions about the way they teach. 
At stake professionally is the fact that how one teaches de-
termines how much time one has to devote to one's scholar-
ship, which in turn decides if and when one gets promoted and 
tenured. This is not to say that those who publish do not 
care about their teaching; but it is to acknowledge that many 
schools place more emphasis on publications for possible 
tenure than they do on teaching evaluations. 
Potentially risky on a more personal level for teachers 
is how to regard recent work on "liberatory" (Freire, Giroux, 
Aronowitz) or "transformative" (Shor) pedagogy that not just 
questionsi but often severely rebukes traditional pedagogical 
practices, linking them pejoratively with conservative 
political policies and the disempowerment of students. 
Referring to "the educational policy of the Bush admin-
istration," Aronowitz and Giroux argue that its aim 
is to wage an ideological offensive to persuade 
. school authorities to see themselves as 
moral agents of intellectual standardization 
[A]lternative goals such as student 
empowerment, individuation, creativity. 
intellectual skepticism. . and unconventional 
learning styles and subject matter are to be 
excluded from approved pedagogical or curricular 
mandates. (8) 
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While Aronowitz and Giroux imply a more causal relationship 
between conservative political policies and college classroom 
practices than may actually exist, the connections they make 
here and throughout their book between political and educa-
tional policies are compelling. One can envision work such 
as this causing a significant amount of intellectual self-ex-
amination on the part of its readers. Such questions as "Is 
my approach to teaching harmful for my students?" may arise. 
Teaching differently or untraditionally is a significant risk 
for teachers; there are many potential dangers with seemingly 
few tangible rewards. As Ira Shor writes, "[D]oing classroom 
research is one way to merge teaching with publication, but 
such research is not yet high-status knowledge rewarded by 
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colleges and universities" (Empowering 233). 
Barriers to pedagogical scholarship outside the academy 
may pose an even greater problem, if one agrees with the ar-
gument above about the ecortomic relationship between teachers 
and students. That is, one engages in self-criticism about 
how well one is living up to the teaching end of the transac-
tion. These obstacles begin with the demands that society at 
large places upon the university; it must produce educated 
students, scientific advancements and other tangible prod-
ucts. There has long been a widespread suspicion that the 
humanities - most notably English and philosophy - do not 
produce anything of (material) value. 
And even to those who will admit that interpretations of 
literary texts actually count as work, it appears that, 
lately, all the humanities seem to be producing is what 
William Bennett terms an "infection" - multiculturalism, de-
construction, theory, etc. (Nelson 40). The furor over 
theory (usually invoked in arguments about political correct-
ness) is based on the assumption that the Great Books have 
been jettisoned and professors are now teaching anything they 
please, as long as the authors are neither dead nor white nor 
male. While it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which 
this view is influential among the public, it does play on a 
complex of anxieties. One fear is that the university is 
wasting many students' time and money. A second is a 
class-based anxiety -· that everyone in the academy knows time 
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and money are being wasted, but doesn't care and feels 
intellectually superior to boot. The public can dismiss the 
university as the "ivory tower," but it still fears that the 
university is smug in its ability to have time to engage in 
the philosophizing and theorizing that nonacademics don't. 
As Paul deMan puts it, "It is a recurrent strategy of any 
anxiety to defuse what it considers threatening by 
magnification or minimization, by attributing to it claims of 
power of which it is bound to fall short" (5). Therefore, 
teachers who study pedagogy theoretically or philosophically 
have cause for concern that such work would not be publicly 
considered legitimate. Time spent thinking about teaching, 
in this view, is time one isn't actually teaching. Popular 
media reports of the easy life college professors enjoy 
abound: 
A professor's working conditions seem [to be] 
heaven on Earth. The hours are wonderfully short, 
six hours in the classroom being considered 
back-breaking labor at prestigious universities. 
During the summer, faculty members with wanderlust 
can usually find some foundation or government 
agency to buy them airline tickets to academic 
conferences in faraway places. (Grossman 3) 
But despite such false characterizations, it is extremely 
important that pedagogical scholarship take place, for two 
162 
major reasons. 
First, university teachers are public intellectuals who, 
in my view, have the responsibility to take a properly ques-
tioning, (self) critical attitude toward all of the "texts" 
i 
they encounter. Despite Bennett and other conservatives' 
calls for the academy to promote the "common culture," the 
university must be a site where skepticism about such notions 
is encouraged, if not celebrated. It is nearly always in a 
battle with outside conservative elements who wish to main-
tain the political and cultural status quo. As Giroux and 
Aronowitz argue, 
What meanings are considered important, what 
experiences are deemed the most legitimate, and 
what forms of writing and reading matter, are 
largely determined by those groups who control 
the. . cultural apparatus of a given society. 
(93) 
Theory and criticism - the "philosophy" of the discipline of 
English - play a crucial role in supporting the role of the 
university. Edward Said argues that criticism must be "oppo-
sitional," "suspicio[us] of totalizing concepts," and "dis-
content[ed] with reified objects [of study]" (29). 
Secondly, I believe teachers need to think (self)criti-
cally about pedagogy because of the number and variety of 
students they affect, the possible influence they may have in 
the construction of student subject positions. In 1980, 
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women became the majority in the university student body in 
the more than 2,000 American institutions of higher learning; 
by 2000, at least 1 million foreign students will be attend-
ing colleges and universities in the United States (Troyka 
253). Considering that English courses are required at al-
most all institutions, the possible consequences of English 
pedagogy are considerable. Moreover, as Giroux and McLaren 
state, education "establish[es] the conditions under which 
some individuals and groups define the terms by which others 
live, resist, affirm, and participate in the construction of 
their own identities and subjectivities" (162). 
Teaching is a political and ethical act for which teach-
ers must take serious responsibility. Derrida suggests that 
such an emphasis is especially important in light of increas-
ing corporate and government involvement in universities. He 
writes of "the necessity for a new way of educating students 
that will prepare them to undertake new analyses in order to 
evaluate [the] ends of. . apparently disinterested re-
search" ("Principle" 16). Gregory Jay concurs: "American ped-
agogy has largely abandoned critical thought out of its obe-
siance to vocationalism. II ( 337) . While both are right, I 
believe, it must also be emphasized that the role of the 
teacher-intellectual should not necessarily be to advocate 
for or against a particular ideological position. It should 
be to call into question every ideology; the teacher cannot 
be apolitical in the process of teaching, but she can·be 
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(self)critical of her own positions and those around her. 
The nature of teaching in America must also figure into 
pedagogy. Yet another paradox of teaching is that while 
America has prided itself on being "democratic," :education 
has not. But if (self)critical pedagogy is about anything, 
it is about radically democratizing schooling. Adam Katz 
writes, 
It is not, as in liberal classrooms, a question 
of "everyone" having his/her own "say," but of 
directing attention to those power relations 
embodied in discourses in such a way a:s to 
enable students to take responsibility for their 
. equal access to the means of. . knowledge 
production. (238) 
Students are typically positioned as mere consumers of knowl-
edge, much as they are consumers of other commodities. (Self) 
critical pedagogy would have them assume subject positions of 
knowledge producers, wherein "reading and writing [are] seen 
as productive categories, as forms of discourse that config-
ure practices of dialogue, struggle, and contestation" 
(Aronowitz and Giroux 93). 
If students are encouraged to believe they have a stake 
in their own educations, perhaps the largest problem with En-
glish pedagogy can be solved - that students are often, to 
put it plainly, bored stiff in English courses. And too many 
teachers are bored with teaching, as well. What may have 
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captivated the attention of undergraduates at some point in 
the past seems to work no longer. One might attribute this 
to TV culture or other societal problems, but I think it is 
also due to the increasingly heterogenous students now at-
tending American colleges and universities - who have far 
different interests and backgrounds than their predecessors. 
Shor argues that "Academic language and bodies of knowledge 
need a multicultural compromise with students' everyday lan-
guage and experience. The academic world of knowledge is 
awesome, but unfortunately it was built without. . respect 
for cultural diversity" (Empowering 84). There is a need not 
only for change in subject matter but also, perhaps more im-
portantly, in teaching practices. But, as Dewey said, 
the road of new education is not an easier one to 
follow than the old road but a more strenuous and 
difficult one. It will remain so until it has 
attained its majority and that attainment will 
require many years of serious co-operative work on 
the part of its adherents. (Experience 90) 
The problem is, Dewey wrote those words in 1938, and they 
have only grown in relevance. If pedagogical change contin-
ues to move so slowly, future students' lack of interest in 
literature and writing may be the least of America's worries 
- much more is at stake. "A democratic society needs the 
creativity and intelligence of its people," Shor writes. 
"[S]tudents need a challenging education that [allows} them 
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[to develop] as thinkers, communicators and citizens. 
Conditions in school and society now limit their development" 
(Empowering 10). (Self)critical thinking and pedagogy can 
help change these conditions, giving students "a chance to 
develop the critical thinking and democratic habits needed 
for active citizenship in society" (85). 
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